



# **City of Grand Island**

**Saturday, April 28, 2012**

**Study Session**

## **Item -1**

### **Presentation of Public Safety Study - Police**

**Staff Contact: Mary Lou Brown**

# **Final Report**

## **Police Operations and Data Analysis**

### **Grand Island, Nebraska**



**POLICE OPERATIONS**

**POLICE OPERATIONS**

C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C S A F E T Y M A N A G E M E N T

Submitted by and reply to:  
ICMA Center for Public Safety  
International City/County Management Association  
777 North Capitol Street NE, Suite 500  
Washington, DC 20002  
[PublicSafety@icma.org](mailto:PublicSafety@icma.org)  
202-962-3607

# **ICMA**

## **General Information**

### **ICMA Background**

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is the premier local government leadership and management organization. Since 1914, ICMA's mission has been to create excellence in local governance by developing and advocating professional local government management worldwide. ICMA provides an information clearinghouse, technical assistance, training, and professional development to more than 9,000 city, town, and county experts and other individuals throughout the world.

### **ICMA Consulting Services**

The ICMA Consulting Services team helps communities solve critical problems by providing management consulting support to local governments. One of ICMA Consulting Services' areas of expertise is public safety services, which encompasses the following areas and beyond: organizational development, leadership and ethics, training, assessment of calls-for-service workload, staffing requirements analysis, design of standards and hiring guidelines for police and fire chief recruitment, police/fire consolidation, community-oriented policing, and city/county/regional mergers.

### **Performance Measures**

The reports generated by the operations and data analysis team are based upon key performance indicators that have been identified in standards and safety regulations and by public safety special interest groups and through the Center for Performance Measurement of ICMA. These performance measures have developed following decades of research and are applicable in all communities. For that reason, comparison of reports will yield similar reporting formats but each community's data are analyzed on an individual

basis by the ICMA specialists and uniquely represent the compiled information for that community.

## **Methodology**

The ICMA *Center for Public Safety Management* team follows a standardized approach to conducting analyses of fire, police, and other departments involved in providing safety services to the public. We have developed this standardized approach by combining the experience sets of dozens of subject matter experts who provide critical roles in data and operations assessments in the areas of police, fire, and EMS. Our collective team has more than a combined 100 years of conducting such studies for cities in the United States and internationally.

We begin most projects by extracting calls for service and raw data from an agency's computer-aided dispatch system. The data are sorted and analyzed for comparison to nationally developed performance indicators. These performance indicators (response times, workload by time, multiple unit dispatching) are valuable measures of agency performance regardless of departmental size. The findings are shown in tabular as well as graphic form and are organized in a logistical format. While most of our documents' structure as well as the categories for performance indicators are standard, the data reported are unique to the jurisdictions. Due to the size and complexity of the documents, this method of structuring the findings allows for simple, clean reporting.

We then conduct an operational review alongside the data analysis. Here the performance indicators serve as the basis for those operational reviews. Therefore, and in addition to the standardized reporting process, the review process follows a standardized approach comparable to that of national accreditation agencies. Prior to any on-site arrival of an ICMA *Public Safety Management team*, we ask agencies to compile a number of key operational

documents (e.g., policies and procedures, assets lists, etc.). Most on-site reviews consist of interviews with management and supervisors as well as rank-and-file officers; we also interview members of the jurisdiction's staff.

As a result of any on-site visits and data assessments, our subject matter experts produce observations and recommendations that highlight strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of all areas under review. Our research and observations include personnel interviews; research of relevant literature, statutes, and regulations; comparative evaluation of police and fire service industry standards; meetings; and other areas specifically included in a project's scope of work.

We have found that this standardized approach ensures that we measure and observe all of the critical components of an agency, which in turn provides substance to benchmark statistics for jurisdictions with similar profiles. We are able to do this because we recognize that while agencies may vary in size and challenges, there are basic commonalities and best practices in use throughout the country.

We liken this standardized approach to the manner of the scientific method: we ask questions and request documentation upon project startup; confirm accuracy of information received; deploy operations and data analysis teams on site to research the uniqueness of each environment; perform data modeling and share preliminary findings with each jurisdiction; assess any inconsistencies reported by client cities; and finally, communicate our results in a formal, written report, and occasionally through an in-person presentation by the project team and other key contributors.

**ICMA Project Contributors**

Thomas J. Wieczorek, Director, ICMA Center for Public Safety

Leonard A. Matarese, Director, Public Safety Services

Kenneth R. Chelst, Senior Public Safety Consultant

Dov N. Chelst, Senior Quantitative Analyst

James Gabbard, Senior Public Safety Consultant

James E. McCabe, Senior Public Safety Consultant

Malhar Kale, Quantitative Analyst

## Table of Contents

<b>I. Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>II. Methodology.....</b>	<b>15</b>
A. Data Analysis .....	15
B. Interviews.....	15
C. Focus Groups .....	15
D. Document Review .....	16
E. Operational/Administrative Observations.....	16
F. Implementing the Report's Recommendations .....	16
<b>III. Background.....</b>	<b>18</b>
A. Grand Island Demographics .....	18
B. Uniform Crime Report/Crime Trends.....	19
<b>IV. Strategic Management and Planning.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>V. Operations.....</b>	<b>35</b>
A. Demand.....	35
B. Patrol Deployment and Staffing .....	40
C. Special Operations .....	54
D. Criminal Investigations Division.....	58
E. Special Investigations.....	61
<b>VI. Administrative &amp; Personnel .....</b>	<b>67</b>
A. Training/School Resource Unit .....	68
B. Code Enforcement and Fleet Management.....	70
C. Desk Officer .....	71
D. Victim Witness Program.....	71
E. 911 Operations Center.....	72
F. Report Writing .....	76
G. Leadership within the Department .....	77
H. Equipment, Vehicles and Facility .....	78
I. Computer Technology .....	80

J. Internal Investigations .....	81
K. Labor-Management Relations .....	82
L. Rules, Regulations, Policies, and Procedures .....	82
<b>VII. Summary .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>VIII. Data Analysis .....</b>	<b>87</b>
A. Workload Analysis.....	88
B. Deployment .....	111
C. Response Times.....	121
<b>Appendix A. Crime Statistics and Rates .....</b>	<b>128</b>



## Tables

Table 1. 2010 Calls for Service .....	37
Table 2. Events per Day, by Initiator .....	92
Table 3. Events per Day, by Category .....	94
Table 4. Calls per Day, by Category .....	96
Table 5. Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months .....	97
Table 6. Calls per Day, by Category and Months .....	100
Table 7. Primary Unit's Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator .....	102
Table 8. Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category .....	104
Table 9. Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-initiated Calls.	105
Table 10. Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Winter 2011.....	107
Table 11. Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Summer 2011 .....	109
Table 12. Average Response Time by Category .....	125
Table 13. 90th Percentiles for Response Time, by Category .....	126

## Figures

Figure 1. Saturation Index by Hour, February 2011 Weekdays .....	46
Figure 2. Saturation Index by Hour, February 2011 Weekends .....	48
Figure 3. Saturation Index by Hour, August 2011 Weekdays .....	49
Figure 4. Saturation Index by Hour, August 2011 Weekends .....	50
Figure 5. Percentage Events per Day, by Initiator .....	92
Figure 6. Percentage Events per Day, by Category .....	93
Figure 7. Percentage Calls per Day, by Category .....	95
Figure 8. Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months .....	97
Figure 9. Calls per Day, by Category and Months .....	99
Figure 10. Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator .....	101
Figure 11. Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category .....	104
Figure 12. Number of Responding Units, by Category .....	105
Figure 13. Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Winter 2011 ..	107
Figure 14. Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Summer 2011	109
Figure 15. Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2011 .....	112
Figure 16. Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2011 .....	112
Figure 17. Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2011 .....	113
Figure 18. Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2011 .....	113
Figure 19. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2011 .....	115
Figure 20. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Winter 2011 .....	115
Figure 21. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2011 .....	116
Figure 22. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Summer 2011 .....	116
Figure 23. Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2011 .....	118
Figure 24. Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2011 .....	118

Figure 25. Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2011 .....	119
Figure 26. Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2011 .....	119
Figure 27. Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, for Summer and Winter 2011 .....	122
Figure 28. Average Response Time by Category, Summer 2011 .....	124
Figure 29. Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2011 .....	124

## **I. Executive Summary**

ICMA was commissioned to review the operations of the Grand Island Police Department (GIPD). While our analysis covered all aspects of the department's operations, a particular focus of our study was on identifying the appropriate staffing of the agency given its workload, community demographics, and crime levels.

We analyzed departmental workload using operations research methodology and compared that workload to staffing and deployment levels. We reviewed other performance indicators, which allowed us to understand the implications of service demand on current staffing. We reviewed the department's organizational design to determine if the many functions required of a modern police agency are staffed appropriately.

Our study involved data collection, interviews with key police and administration personnel, on-site observations of the job environment, data analysis, comparative analyses, and development of alternatives and recommendations. This written report will be followed by oral briefings.

Based on our review, it is our opinion that the GIPD is a highly professional, well-managed police agency. We found no serious deficits in the department. However, as in all organizations, there are areas for improvement. Embracing these opportunities for improvement will enable the department to carry out its mission, and, through a process of continuous improvement, fulfill its core values of life, law, integrity, accountability, service, community partnerships, and excellence.

In general, the department appears to be understaffed, and additional sworn personnel are necessary to meet service demands and fulfill the mission of the department. At the same time, ICMA believes that there are

opportunities to supplement and/or replace tasks now performed by sworn officers with new, nonsworn personnel.

ICMA is making the following recommendations for the department. These recommendations are intended to help improve an organization that is performing well already.

***Recommendations:***

- **Adopt a strategic approach to managing police operations.**
- **Empanel a “calls for service” committee with relevant stakeholders to identify calls of service that can be eliminated from a sworn police response.**
- **Create a third shift of officers (called a swing shift or impact team) and staff it with an appropriate number of officers and supervisors. This shift would supplement the current patrol deployment and would also engage in proactive enforcement to address crime and quality-of-life issues in the community.**
- **Create a supervisory position on each shift called the special operations sergeant who will coordinate crime, traffic, and quality-of-life enforcement activities pursuant to the strategic management approach.**
- **Increase the number of community service officers to six full-time positions and assign two CSOs to each tour to assist the special operations sergeants in implementing strategic plans.**
- **Create a robust crime prevention program and staff a dedicated, sworn position of crime prevention officer.**
- **Take immediate steps to implement a case management system that allows GIPD investigative supervisors to track investigations by individual investigator as well as monitor the**

**clearance rates of the unit as a whole. These are essential pieces of information to evaluate the effectiveness of investigative efforts. The failure to track these data is problematic and needs to be addressed immediately.**

- Staff the criminal investigations division with one permanent civilian staff member to assist in the administration and management of the division.**
- Staff the criminal investigations division with one permanent civilian staff member assigned to criminal intelligence and crime analysis.**
- Review protocols for crime scene investigations.**
- Consideration should be given to folding the administration division into the criminal investigations division, thus transferring oversight of administrative functions to the captain in charge of criminal investigations and eliminating one captain position in the agency.**
- Empanel a joint committee on communications comprised of representatives from all agencies to discuss staffing, call taking, response, and emergency management issues.**
- The police department and the city should take immediate steps to determine what is needed to implement a field reporting system for the department. A portable, in-car system is needed to obtain higher quality reports in a more efficient and timely manner. Undertaking this project has widespread support within the department and within the city leadership.**
- Institute a formal leadership development program for midlevel supervisors to ensure future leadership excellence within the GIPD.**

- **The department should consider designating investigative capacity to coordinate all internal investigations.**
- **Add sworn personnel to positions responsible for the areas of training, criminal intelligence, and community policing.**

## **II. Methodology**

### **A. Data Analysis**

We used numerous sources of data to support our conclusions and recommendations for the Grand Island Police Department. Information was obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, Part I offenses, along with numerous sources of GIPD internal information. UCR Part I crimes are defined as murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and larceny of a motor vehicle. Internal sources included data from the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system for information on calls for service (CFS).

### **B. Interviews**

This study relied extensively on intensive interviews with GIPD personnel. On-site and in-person interviews were conducted with all division commanders regarding their operations. We interviewed representatives of the union to get an understanding of the labor-management climate in the GIPD.

### **C. Focus Groups**

A focus group is an unstructured group interview in which the moderator actively encourages discussion among participants. Focus groups generally consist of eight to ten participants and are used to explore issues that are difficult to define. Group discussion permits greater exploration of topics. For the purposes of this study, focus groups were held with representatives of the department.



## **D. Document Review**

ICMA consultants were furnished with numerous reports and summary documents by the Grand Island Police Department. Information on strategic plans, personnel staffing and deployment, evaluations, training records, and performance statistics were provided.

## **E. Operational/Administrative Observations**

Over the course of the evaluation period, numerous observations were conducted. These included observations of general patrol, special enforcement, investigations, and administrative functions. ICMA representatives engaged all facets of department operations from a “participant observation” perspective.

## **F. Implementing the Report’s Recommendations**

ICMA’s conclusions and recommendations are a blueprint for both the city and police administrations. The city administration should have periodic meetings with the GIPD to ensure that ICMA’s recommendations are implemented. It is strongly recommended that the chief identify and task one individual with responsibility for implementing these recommendations. This person should establish a liaison with the chief of police, and should be given the authority and responsibility to effectuate the changes recommended. This includes ensuring the recommendations are executed in a timely fashion and then evaluating the department’s progress every six months for efficiency, effectiveness, and performance.

All of ICMA’s recommendations are practical and sensible and should be implemented by the police administration within a reasonable period of time. If the city desires, ICMA can provide a service to review, monitor, and

evaluate the department's progress and ensure that the recommendations are being implemented properly. If the police administration continues to have difficulty implementing the recommendations, ICMA can assist with implementation.

### **III. Background**

Policing involves a complex set of activities. Police officers are not simply crime fighters whose responsibilities are to protect people's safety and property and to enhance the public's sense of security. The police have myriad other basic responsibilities on a daily basis, including preserving order in the community, guaranteeing the movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, protecting and extending the rights of persons to speak and assemble freely, and providing assistance for those who cannot assist themselves.

The Grand Island Police Department provides a full range of police services, including responding to emergencies and calls for service, performing directed activities, and solving problems. Both the city and the police department are dedicated to the principles of community policing, and the department strives to provide a high level of service to the Grand Island community.

#### **A. Grand Island Demographics**

When determining the appropriateness of the deployed resources—both current and future—a key factor for consideration is the demographics of the community.

Grand Island is located in Hall County and is a commercial and retail hub in central Nebraska. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the city's population has grown significantly over the past two decades, and is now estimated at 48,000.

The racial makeup of the city is estimated to be 80.0 percent white, 2.1 percent African American, 1.0 percent American Indian, 1.2 percent Asian,

2.4 percent two or more races, and 13.1 percent other race. Of the total population, approximately 26.7 percent is Hispanic or Latino.

## **B. Uniform Crime Report/Crime Trends**

As defined by the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the seven major Part I offenses are used to measure the extent, fluctuation, and distribution of serious crime in geographical areas. Part I crimes are the seven most serious offenses: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.

In 2010, the City of Grand Island reported 2,465 Part I crimes, compared to 2,448 in 2009, or a very slight 0.69 percent increase. Appendix A displays the seven serious offenses for 2010 and puts the reported crime into proper context. The year 2010 was chosen because comparison crime data for Nebraska cities is only available up until that year; 2011 data is not yet available.

The crime rate in Grand Island is high. The violent crime rate in Grand Island is 25.4 percent higher than the state rate. Similarly, Grand Island has a high rate of property crime. According to the data in Appendix A, the rate of property crime is 63 percent higher than the national average and 79 percent higher than the state average.

Larceny in Grand Island is the highest reported crime and the one crime that drives the overall rate of crime in the community. In 2010, Grand Island recorded 1,829 larcenies, which represented 74.2 percent of all serious crime. Larceny has decreased in the city by 11.1 percent, from 2,057 reported larcenies to 1,829 in 2010.

The rate of larceny in Grand Island compared to other communities in Nebraska and the nation as a whole is high. The rate of larceny in Grand

Island is nearly double the rate of larceny in Nebraska and in the U.S. and second behind only North Platte among the comparison communities.

Additionally, Grand Island can be compared to other cities in Nebraska by rank-order of crime rates. To do this, we took information from the FBI UCR Program on *Crime in the United States* and compared Grand Island with the other top ten cities by population size in Nebraska.

For this analysis, Omaha, Lincoln, Bellevue, Kearney, Hastings, Fremont, North Platte, and Norfolk were used. These cities plus Grand Island at number four represent the top nine cities in order of population. It should be noted that the populations of these cities range from 443,000 to 23,000. This analysis is not intended to compare Grand Island with Omaha or Norfolk. Rather, it is simply meant as an illustration of large cities in Nebraska and how they compare with respect to rates of crime.

Using the data from Appendix A, rankings were constructed to demonstrate the order from highest to lowest on several categories of serious crime. A "1" in the table indicates the jurisdiction had the highest rate of crime for that category among the benchmark cities. Similarly, a "10" in the table represents the lowest rate of crime in that category among the cities.

Examination of the relative ranks of the cities indicates that Grand Island ranks 3rd in violent crime rate and 1st in property crime rate. Grand Island also ranks 4th in population size, so the crime rankings in the city indicate that crime is greater than the population-adjusted rates would suggest.

Combining both rankings, Grand Island has the highest rate of serious crime of the ten cities. The rate of serious crime in Grand Island is 79 percent higher than the serious crime rate in Nebraska and about 63 percent higher than the national rate.

Since 2001 the rate of violent crime in Grand Island has increased by 29 percent from a rate of 130 violent crimes per 100,000 population to 168 violent per 100,000. Over the same period, the property crime rate decreased 21 percent from 2,907 to 2,297 property crimes per 100,000 residents.

According to the National Citizen Survey conducted by ICMA, the Grand Island community's perception of public safety falls in the "much below" category in comparison to the benchmark communities used in the survey regarding levels of safety in their neighborhood and downtown during the day and after dark. Twenty-five percent of residents reported feeling somewhat or very unsafe in their neighborhoods after dark, and 64 percent reported feeling somewhat or very unsafe downtown after dark.

Fear of crime is an important variable when evaluating the quality of life in a community and Grand Island residents report very low marks in this category. The Grand Island Police Department must take immediate steps to address the crime and fear of crime problem.

Our report now turns to the various elements of the GIPD and an assessment of those elements in context with prevailing industry standards and best practices.

## **IV. Strategic Management and Planning**

Strategic management is the process of establishing and managing an organization's mission. Strategic planning is the process by which an organization focuses its efforts and directs its resources toward accomplishing its mission.

The mission of the Grand Island Police Department is "to enhance the quality of life in our community by working with the public and within the framework of the United States Constitution, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide a safe environment for all our citizens." From a strategic perspective, it appears that the GIPD is struggling to fulfill the stated mission of the organization. Violent crime, property crime, and the fear of crime are high and this compromises the quality of life in Grand Island and creates an unsafe environment for the community.

Crime is caused by many factors. Over the past century, theories of crime have abounded, and there are many perspectives and schools of thought regarding the nature of crime and why it happens. The use and sale of drugs, availability of guns, gangs, poverty, unemployment, poor education, high residential turnover, poor housing, cultural conflict, and dysfunctional families, have all been associated with crime. One prominent theory, called social disorganization theory, has received much acclaim over the last thirty years and it is relevant to Grand Island and the strategic management of the GIPD.

Social disorganization theory suggests that serious crime is a function of social and physical disorder present in a community. First advanced by University of Chicago sociologists Shaw and McKay, social disorganization was defined as low socioeconomic status, high residential mobility, high cultural diversity, poor housing stock, and dysfunctional families. The

concept has evolved to define disorder on a continuum, with low-level physical disorder on one end and serious criminal disorder on the other end of the continuum.

Continuum of Disorder:

Physical Disorder ----- (Low seriousness)	Social Disorder ----- (Medium Seriousness)	Serious Crime (High Seriousness)
Graffiti Derelict Cars Litter Abandoned Property	Public Drinking Noise Traffic Prostitution Drugs	Violent Crime Property Crime

Serious crimes, therefore, are not isolated events; they are part of a continuum of disorder and part of the fabric of a community. The most well-known articulation of this perspective is the "broken windows" metaphor described by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. Wilson and Kelling's article "Broken Windows" appeared in a 1982 edition of *Atlantic Monthly*, and it argued that crime and the fear of crime are products of "broken windows" in a community. Literally, when a property has a broken window and it is not repaired, the broken window sends a signal to people in the community that no one cares about the property and also invites the breaking of more windows and further disrepair of the property. This in turn invites more frequent and serious disorder, inviting people to "hang-out," drink alcohol, use drugs, make noise, be disorderly, and the like because no one is in charge of the area. Eventually, this combination of physical and social disorder will lead to serious criminal activity.

Broken windows are used in the "metaphorical" sense, where any signs of community disorder are the equivalent of a "broken window." If the disorder is left unaddressed, it signals to the community that there is a lack of control, and sends an invitation for further disorder and serious crime. Thus,



from a community perspective, “broken windows,” or signs of both physical and social disorder, are important and visible precursors to serious criminal activity. If left unrepaired, the literal and metaphorical broken windows contribute in an indirect way to crime and the fear of crime in a community.

Communities around the U.S. have taken an aggressive stance in response to “broken windows” and social disorder. From a police perspective, addressing “broken windows” is not only responsive to community complaints, it will have a direct effect on reducing serious crime in the community.

Returning to the National Citizen Survey for 2011, 14 percent of the residents of Grand Island perceive that run-down buildings, weed-filled lots, and junk vehicles are a major problem in the city. Furthermore, code enforcement of these physical conditions scores a rating of 38 out of 100, putting Grand Island in the “much below” category of benchmark comparisons. Similarly, Grand Island scores a 49 out of 100 on “overall appearance” on the National Citizen Survey, and again ranks near the bottom of benchmark comparisons with a “much below” category rating.

In addition to signs of physical disorder, Grand Island is also witness to indicators of social disorder as well. Several criminal gangs exist in Grand Island, and gang activity is a concern for residents and the police alike. Grand Island is also in a prime geographic location for moving drugs through the state and is considered a major hub for drug trafficking in the region. The GIPD has members on several “task forces” to combat both drugs and gangs. The Central Nebraska Drug Task Force, Safe Streets Task Force, and Nebraska Gang Task Force are collaborative enforcement efforts between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to address the incidence of gangs and drugs in Grand Island and other central Nebraska communities (see discussion on task forces below).

Furthermore, Grand Island has a rapidly diversifying population. Data from the GISD indicate that more than 50 percent of the student population in Grand Island schools is of minority descent. The energy and culture these residents bring to Grand Island is tremendous, but it also means a high degree of residential diversity; an influx of new residents; and the arrival of new cultures, traditions, and behaviors to the community. These new cultures do not always comport with the existing norms of the community and, according to social disorganization theory, can lead to disorder in a community.

The convergence of these factors – residential turnover, physical signs of disorder, and the social disorder of gangs and drugs – create conditions conducive to crime. It appears that Grand Island is exhibiting many of these conditions and that these conditions contribute to a high level of crime.

The implications of the concept of disorder from a police perspective is that the situation calls for renewed and aggressive strategic management and strategic planning directed at fulfilling the fundamental purpose of the organization. The GIPD's mission is to reduce crime and the fear of crime and provide for a safe community. In order to achieve this mission, the GIPD should embrace strategic management and planning. These efforts must be backed with the use of appropriate performance measures, proper organizational alignment, and effective tactics.

### *1. Performance Measures*

This strategic focus demands that appropriate measures be developed and tracked to ensure that plans, policies, and programs are effective in achieving the goals of the department. Mark Moore and Anthony Braga (2004) in their article "Police Performance Measures" argue that six general measures are appropriate to evaluate the performance of a police agency.

According to Moore and Braga, a police department should 1) reduce crime, 2) hold offenders accountable, 3) reduce the fear of crime and promote security, 4) encourage public-centered crime defense programs, 5) improve traffic safety, and 6) provide essential emergency services. From a strategic management perspective, each of these six broad areas of police responsibility should be part of the police mandate, each of these measures should be measured, and plans and tactics must be created to achieve success in each area.

It is recommended that the GIPD establish measures for each of these six categories and that city leaders hold the police department accountable for achieving improvements in each area. While there is no exact measure for each area, it is suggested that the following data be used to track performance:

<b>Performance Domain</b>	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Benchmark</b>	<b>Target</b>
Crime Reduction	UCR Part I crime rate	NE Top 9 City average	3,773 serious crime per 100,000 VC rate – 265 PC rate – 3,508
Holding Offenders Accountable	Crime Clearance Rate	UCR Part I average Group IV cities, % cases cleared (25-50K Population)	VC – 49.9% PC – 21.3%
Fear of Crime	ICMA National Cities Survey	ICMA National Cities Survey	Average
Public-centered crime defense	Crime prevention programs	Baseline	Increase over baseline
Traffic Safety	Traffic Accidents and Injuries	Traffic Injury Rate (Injury/pop)	Baseline TBD
Providing Emergency Services	CFS Response time and Saturation Index	- CFS response time - Saturation Index	- Less than 5.0 min. for Priority 1 - Less than 60%

These areas of performance become, therefore, the strategic focus of the department. All programs, plans, tactics, and efforts are directed at improving the measures in these areas. Frequent and regular reporting of this information is critical, as is strict accountability for achieving the desired results.

For example, the violent crime rate in Grand Island increased dramatically in the past twenty years. Thus, from a strategic perspective, reducing violent crime is a paramount goal of the organization. One example we could use is having the department focus on the number of aggravated assaults reported to the police. This category of crime was selected because of the relative frequency of this crime compared to the other crimes (murder, rape, and robbery) in the violent crime category. To improve its performance, the department could first measure and track all aspects of aggravated assault, and then create a response in the form of deployment, tactics, and initiatives aimed at reducing the crime. The results of the deployment, tactics, and initiatives would be monitored continuously to evaluate the success of the efforts. When aggravated assaults decline, programs should continue. If aggravated assaults increase, plans need to be modified immediately in response to the trend.

This approach has been referred to by several different titles. It is commonly known as the "S.A.R.A." model in community policing (scanning-analysis-response-assessment), or the COMPSTAT model developed in New York City (timely intelligence-effective tactics-rapid deployment-relentless follow-up), or the policy model from the public administration arena (problem identification-policy development-policy implementation-policy evaluation). Regardless of what this approach is called, it is essentially a strategic approach, articulating the mission of the organization into quantifiable and measureable terms and using those measures to drive the efforts and performance of the entire organization. It begins with identifying the

problem. In this example, the problem is aggravated assault as measured by UCR crime counts. A thorough analysis of these crimes is necessary, determining where, when, how, and why they were committed and by whom. Armed with this information, officers can be deployed, programs initiated, and occurrences tracked to determine the impact of the police efforts.

If the analysis of where-when-how-why indicates that domestic violence is the source of a high number of aggravated assaults, then domestic violence reduction must become the focus of the department's efforts. If the analysis reveals that certain business establishments are related to a high number of aggravated assaults, then the efforts of the department must be directed at closing these locations or bringing them under control to stop the violence.

## *2. Problem-Oriented vs. Strategic-Oriented*

Problem-oriented policing is an approach to policing in which discrete pieces of police business, whether crime or acts of disorder, are subject to microscopic examination in the hope that what is learned about each problem will lead to a new and more effective strategy for dealing with it.<sup>1</sup> Within a strategic approach, problem-oriented policing becomes one of the main tactics brought to bear on crime, fear of crime, traffic safety, and other areas, and is the principle vehicle for identifying problems and creating workable solutions.

The problem-oriented approach works within the strategic framework, and is not an isolated police approach to community problems. In other words, the emphasis is on results – the measures of the six categories identified by Moore and Braga – and the police department is responsible and held

---

<sup>1</sup> *Center of Problem-oriented policing*, retrieved at <http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=whatiscpop>

accountable for success in these areas. Focusing on just a problem-oriented approach would narrow the focus on problems and their solutions, and not necessarily whether or not those solutions had any connection to the overall mission in the first place. In other words, the police can be very effective at addressing problems, but unless the result of that problem solving has an impact on improving one of the six areas of strategic focus, then the effort was wasted. It is not problem solving for its own sake, but problem solving with an overall purpose.

In the case of the GIPD, this overall purpose is “to enhance the quality of life in our community by working with the public and within the framework of the United States Constitution, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide a safe environment for all our citizens.” It is recommended that the six performance domains listed above be utilized to track whether or not this mission is being achieved, and it is further recommended that the performance measures be used to monitor the GIPD’s effort and to hold the department accountable for success in these areas.

### *3. DDACTS and POP in Grand Island*

Currently, the GIPD is exploring this type of strategic approach with a strategy known as Data Driven Approaches to Crime *and* Traffic Safety (DDACTS). According to the University of Maryland, DDACTS integrates location-based crime and traffic data to establish effective and efficient methods for deploying law enforcement and other resources. Using geomapping to identify areas that have high incidences of both crime and vehicle crashes, DDACTS uses traffic enforcement strategies that play a dual role in fighting crime and reducing crashes and traffic violations. Drawing on the deterrent of highly visible traffic enforcement and the knowledge that

crime often involves the use of motor vehicles, the goal of DDACTS is to reduce the incidence of crime, crashes, and traffic violations.<sup>2</sup>

The GIPD, under the leadership of Captain Falldorf, has explored the use of DDACTS in Grand Island. Traffic accidents and selected categories of crime were identified over a one-year period and mapped to indicate targeted areas. Based upon this mapping, three DDACTS areas were designated, and at least one time per 12-hour shift, saturation and aggressive patrols for thirty-minute periods were conducted. The enforcement and DDACTS patrols were deployed for six months from February 1 until July 31, 2011. After six months an assessment was conducted of the impact of these efforts on the selected crime and traffic incidents.

This was an excellent attempt by the GIPD to use a strategic management and planning approach. The GIPD should be commended for initiating DDACTS and it is strongly recommended that the department modify and aggressively reembrace this strategy. The DDACTS approach has several advantages and disadvantages, but the underlying philosophy is an excellent one: identifying the crime, traffic, and quality-of-life issues affecting the community and using all available resources available to combat these issues.

The following modifications of the DDACTS approach are offered to align it more appropriately with the conditions in Grand Island. These recommendations were already discussed with Captain Falldorf and he understands the limitations of the initial effort and ways in which it can be improved upon.

---

<sup>2</sup> <http://stko.maryland.gov/DDACTS/WhatisDDACTS/tabid/128/Default.aspx>

### Strengths:

- Uses data to identify hot spots of crime and traffic problems
- Establishes a baseline of problems and conditions with data
- Uses high-visibility patrols
- Uses aggressive enforcement by patrol
- Uses follow-up data analysis to determine impact
- Identifies multiple conditions linked to the mission of the GIPD (gangs, drugs, graffiti, traffic accidents, weapon assaults, etc.)
- Uses problem-oriented policing tactics to address conditions.

### Weaknesses:

- Time of follow-up too long (six months)
- Too much data on assessment map
- Only relied on patrol enforcement
- Did not identify time of day and day of week of conditions
- Makes the assumption that crime and traffic are connected (this is a problem with the DDACTS approach and not the GIPD implementation of the approach).

### Recommendations for Improvement:

- Isolate individual crime, traffic, and quality-of-life concerns and map them separately, for example, a traffic accident map, burglary map, a drug call map, etc.
- Break down crime, traffic, and quality-of-life issues by time and day of week and map accordingly.
- Identify the causes of the crime, traffic, and quality-of-life conditions.
- Develop tactical plans based upon the identified causes. This should also include the DDACTS saturation/aggressive patrols already instituted.



- Integrate all operational units of the GIPD.
- Use mapping software instead of paper maps to integrate problem areas as appropriate
- Display maps throughout the police facility and make them discussion topics at training and at the beginning of each shift.
- Track crime, traffic, and quality-of-life issues more frequently and perform assessments more frequently. It is recommended that conditions get assessed each week.
- Affix accountability with crime, traffic, and quality-of-life conditions with individual supervisors.

In order to demonstrate how this modified DDACTS approach might work within a strategic framework, the example of the crime category of aggravated assault will be continued. Aggravated assault, as discussed previously in this report, is the most prevalent violent crime in Grand Island. Using the DDACTS-style approach, it is recommended that a map be created that plots the locations and times of all aggravated assaults for the last year. In addition to the assault map, a thorough analysis of each assault must be completed to identify types (domestic violence, bar/night-club related, gang, against officers, etc.), weapons used (gun, knife, bottle, etc.), offender-victim relationship, locations (school, park, street, residence, commercial, etc.). Based upon all of this information, the department should create a strategic plan that integrates all operational components of the GIPD and targets the most prevalent locations and offenders of aggravated assault. The plan must be implemented and enforcement activities must be tracked on a daily basis. Any incidents of aggravated assault must be dissected to determine what happened and why, and a determination must be made to modify the plan in place to prevent future assaults.

Suppose for example, based upon the analysis of aggravated assault, that a large category of aggravated assault complaints are related to bars and

nightclubs, and that these incidents are occurring at night and on the weekends. To reduce assaults at these locations the GIPD must develop a strategic plan integrating all components of the department. To do this, accountability should be affixed with the night-shift supervisor and the following tactics might be employed:

- Inspect bars early in the evening to deter problem/unruly behavior
- Enlist the assistance of the liquor authority to close unruly locations
- Deploy saturation patrols in front of problematic locations
- Enforce laws and ordinances strictly in the vicinity of problematic locations
- Conduct vehicle safety checkpoints in the vicinity of problematic locations
- Conduct code enforcement operations regularly at problematic locations
- Direct undercover operations at alcohol sales to minors at problematic locations
- Enhance prosecution of aggravated assault cases by investigators and prosecutors
- Conduct aggressive follow-up on all assault cases, including periodic warrant checks on past offenders
- Provide security training for bars and night-clubs to assist them in preventing violence in their establishments
- Use aggressive towing in and around problematic locations
- Conduct surveillance at locations to identify patrons refused entrance and to monitor conditions.

After the appropriate tactics are identified, the plan is implemented. Then, activity related to the various elements of the plan is tracked, and incidents of assault are monitored weekly and monthly to determine if the plan is working. Additionally, each aggravated assault from a bar or nightclub must

be scrutinized thoroughly. An “after-action” investigation should be conducted, and a determination made on how the assault occurred and what needs to be done to prevent future assaults from occurring.

In a nutshell, this is a strategic approach to addressing crime in the community. In this case the crime is aggravated assault. The strategic approach integrates data analysis and problem solving, but relies more heavily on affixing accountability, assessing events more aggressively, and incorporating more elements of the organization.

It is strongly recommended that the GIPD adopt this type of approach with each major category of crime, traffic crashes, and quality-of-life violations. Each plan should be written and disseminated throughout the department and ultimately integrated into an overall strategic plan. The GIPD is already employing the basic elements of this approach with DDACTS and the problem-oriented policing philosophy. It is strongly recommended that these approaches be continued, but expanded upon and modified to embrace the more thorough and aggressive approach detailed above.

## **V. Operations**

The GIPD provides the community with a full range of police services, including responding to emergencies and calls for service (CFS), performing directed activities, and solving problems. The GIPD is a service-oriented department providing a high level of service to the community. Essentially, every call for service gets a police response and every criminal case gets investigated. The department embraces this approach and considers every request for service from the public important and deserving of a police response. This approach to policing in Grand Island has created what can accurately be called a “culture of service,” because this orientation is noticeable throughout the department.

### **A. Demand**

Time and time again, it was reported to the ICMA team that no call is considered too minor to warrant a response and no case is too small to warrant an investigation. From the command staff to the rank-and-file officers, this approach was demonstrated to us on numerous occasions. The result of this policing philosophy is the delivery of comprehensive policing services to the Grand Island community. The department has the hallmark of a small-town approach to policing, in which people are not just citizens but members of a community. Service is personalized, the police are part of the fabric of the community, and expectations for police service are high.

This approach is not without costs, however. Considerable resources are needed to maintain the small-town approach. The patrol division must be staffed with enough officers to respond to virtually every call placed to the GIPD, and the investigative division must be prepared to investigate every case that presents itself. From conversations with GIPD officers of all ranks,

it's clear that the community of Grand Island expects this level of service, and the GIPD is structured to deliver it.

As the community's demographics change, however, it will be necessary to make critical decisions about continuing this approach. Because the department entertains almost every request for police service, the choice will be between the options of "Do we continue to police the community in a full-service mode?" and "What steps can we take to restructure demand and still promote order and safety?" That is, the department must decide whether to sustain this comprehensive level of police service or take the steps necessary to manage it. Essentially, this is a political decision regarding the quantity of police services offered to the Grand Island community. But quality doesn't need to suffer. The recommendations offered regarding operations, if implemented, will permit the GIPD to continue its full-service model of policing and run the agency more efficiently while keeping personnel resources stable into the foreseeable future.

***Recommendation:***

**Empanel a calls for service committee in order to evaluate service demands and attempt to reduce nonemergency responses.**

**Table 1. 2010 Calls for Service**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total Calls</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Accidents	1,943	9.3
Alarm	1,436	6.9
Animal calls	69	0.3
Assist other agency	484	2.3
Check/investigation	3,915	18.8
Crime-persons	2,393	11.5
Crime-property	3,238	15.6
Disturbance	2,210	10.6
Juvenile	1,092	5.2
Miscellaneous	1,202	5.8
Prisoner-arrest	370	1.8
Prisoner-transport	11	0.1
Suspicious person/vehicle	1,456	7.0
Traffic enforcement	994	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>20,813</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 1 presents several main categories of calls for service received from the public that were handled by the GIPD from September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2011. In total, GIPD officers were dispatched to 20,813 calls during that 12-month period, or approximately fifty-seven calls per day.

The quantity and quality of calls for service can be examined for enormous potential for operational efficiencies. Certain types of calls – burglar alarms, traffic complaints, traffic crashes-property damage, and animal complaints – do not necessarily require the response of a sworn police officer. For example, at motor vehicle accidents involving only property damage, the police role is largely administrative: preparing and filing reports. Similarly, industry experience also tells us that greater than 98 percent of all burglar alarms are false alarms and that CFS regarding animal complaints are typically only nuisance-type calls and do not involve a matter of public safety or danger. The bottom line here is that a substantial number of CFS dispatches to officers in the GIPD could be eliminated.

The alarm industry is a strong advocate of developing ordinances and procedures to address police responses to false alarms and will work closely with any agency exploring this issue. The 98 percent of alarm calls that are false are caused by user error, and this can be addressed by alarm management programs. For example, a double-call verification protocol is becoming the norm across the country. Alarm reduction needs to be addressed aggressively in Grand Island. Adopting an alarm callback program has the potential to reduce calls for service by up to 1,000 calls, or roughly 5 percent of all CFS that come from the public.

Automobile accidents are another category for which the response by a sworn officer is questionable. Most accidents involve only property damage to vehicles and the role of an officer is simply report preparation. When injuries occur or vehicles are inoperable and blocking traffic, however, police response is important. Proper training of dispatchers and inquiries by dispatchers during the initial call-taking process can easily triage vehicle accident calls to determine which ones actually require a police response.

Dispatching police officers to all vehicle crashes is not recommended. Examination of Table 1 indicates that almost 10 percent of all CFS handled during the study period were traffic accidents. Arguably, most of these CFS were administrative in nature and did not necessarily warrant the response of a sworn police officer.

Similarly, a large percentage of calls fall into the category of "traffic complaints." During the study period, 3,915, or 18.8 percent of all CFS, were for "check/investigation." Here again, it is recommended that this major category of CFS be scrutinized to determine which calls require the response of a sworn officer. This category appears to be a catch-all for CFS that defy definition and, therefore, may not be police issues. It is recommended that this entire category of CFS be examined and calls be

identified that can be screened out of the police response requirement. Closer examination of these CFS will likely reveal that officers are dispatched to minor and nonemergency events.

Three categories of CFS—accidents, alarms, check/investigation—represent more than 35 percent of the patrol CFS workload in Grand Island, but a police response at the large majority of these incidents is likely not necessary. These categories of CFS must be examined carefully. It is strongly recommended, therefore, that the GIPD establish a committee that includes all the principal stakeholders in this process and which has the responsibility of evaluating the CFS workload with an eye toward reducing nonemergency CFS response. This committee should begin with these three major categories of CFS response and formulate the response (or nonresponse) protocols for these assignments.

Our data analysis supports the notion that a thorough examination by the GIPD of CFS response is necessary in order to eliminate, downsize, and streamline CFS.

ICMA recommends that from a policy perspective the responses to major categories of CFS be reduced, including responses to traffic accidents involving only property damage; an alarm callback system be instituted; and 911 call-takers and dispatchers be trained to trigger a police response in cases only when there is an emergency situation.

Further examination of various elements of the CFS and patrol response data also warrants discussion. Data from various tables and charts in the data analysis section of this report provide a wealth of information about demand, workload, and deployment in Grand Island. Three key pieces of information need to be highlighted to demonstrate the effective use of patrol resources in Grand Island. These three statistics are found in tables entitled Occupied Time; Number of Responding Units; and Average Response Times.



Taken together these statistics provide an excellent lens through which to view the efficiency of patrol operations in Grand Island.

According to these data, GIPD patrol units on average take 35.2 minutes to handle a call for service. This figure is approximately 18 percent more time than average occupied time for a CFS of about 29.8 minutes, based on our experience.<sup>3</sup> Also, the GIPD dispatches 1.7 officers per CFS. The number of officers dispatched (like occupied time) varies by category of call, but is right on par with policing norms of about 1.7 officers per CFS. In other words, the GIPD uses the appropriate amount of officers to handle a CFS but takes more time to handle a call than an average police response of similar size agencies.

Similarly, response times for CFS in Grand Island averages around eleven minutes per call. This is substantially lower than many communities of similar size and well below the generally accepted target response time of twenty minutes per call.

Taken together, our analysis of occupied time, number of officers per call, and response time shows an efficient deployment of patrol officers to CFS.

## **B. Patrol Deployment and Staffing**

Uniformed patrol is considered the “backbone” of American policing. Bureau of Justice statistics indicate that more than 95 percent of police departments in the U.S. in the same size category as the GIPD provide uniformed patrol. Officers assigned to this important function are the most visible members of the department and command the largest share of resources committed by the department. Proper allocation of these resources is critical in order to

---

<sup>3</sup> ICMA considers 29.8 minutes to be a benchmark of police departments to handle CFS. This figure is derived from data analyses of police agencies similar to the GIPD.

have officers available to respond to calls for service and provide law enforcement services to the public.

In Grand Island general patrol operations are staffed using 12-hour shifts. The day shift is supervised by four sergeants in four teams. The day shift reports to work at 6 a.m. and rotates days off. The night shift has a similar supervisory configuration and reports to work at 6 p.m.

Our examination of the patrol staffing and workload demands, combined with on-site observations and industry norms, leads us to several recommendations with respect to patrol deployment.

Although some police administrators suggest that there are national standards for the number of officers per thousand residents, that is not the case. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) states that ready-made, universally applicable patrol staffing standards do not exist. Furthermore, ratios such as officers-per-thousand population are inappropriate to use as the basis for staffing decisions.

According to *Public Management* magazine, "A key resource is discretionary patrol time, or the time available for officers to make self-initiated stops, advise a victim in how to prevent the next crime, or call property owners, neighbors, or local agencies to report problems or request assistance. Understanding discretionary time, and how it is used, is vital. Yet most police departments do not compile such data effectively. To be sure, this is not easy to do and, in some departments may require improvements in management information systems."<sup>4</sup>

Essentially, "discretionary time" on patrol is the amount of time available each day where officers are not committed to handling CFS and workload

---

<sup>4</sup> John Campbell, Joseph Brann, and David Williams, "Officer-per-Thousand Formulas and Other Policy Myths," *Public Management* 86 (March 2004): 22-27.

demands from the public. It is "discretionary" and intended to be used at the discretion of the officer to address problems in the community and be available in the event of emergencies. When there is no discretionary time, officers are entirely committed to service demands, do not get the chance to address other community problems that do not arise through 911, and are not available in times of serious emergency. The lack of discretionary time indicates a department is understaffed. Conversely, when there is too much discretionary time officers are idle. This is also an indication that the department is overstaffed.

Staffing decisions, particularly in patrol, must be based on actual workload. Once the actual workload is determined the amount of discretionary time is determined and then staffing decisions can be made consistent with the department's policing philosophy and the community's ability to fund it. The GIPD is a full-service police department, and the philosophy is to address essentially all requests for service in a community policing style. With this in mind it is necessary to look at workload to understand the impact this style of policing in the context of community demand.

To understand *actual workload* (the time required to complete certain activities) it is critical to review total reported events within the context of how the events originated, such as through directed patrol, administrative tasks, officer-initiated activities, and citizen-initiated activities. Doing this analysis allows identification of activities that are really "calls" from those activities that are some other event.

Understanding the difference between the various types of police department events and the staffing implications is critical to determining deployment needs. This portion of the study looks at the total deployed hours of the police department with a comparison to the time being spent to currently provide services.

From an organizational standpoint, it is important to have uniformed patrol resources available at all times of the day to deal with issues such as proactive enforcement and community policing. Patrol is generally the most visible and most available resource in policing and the ability to harness this resource is critical for successful operations.

From an officer's standpoint, once a certain level of CFS activity is reached, the officer's focus shifts to a CFS-based reactionary mode. Once a threshold is reached, the patrol officer's mindset begins to shift from one that looks for ways to deal with crime and quality-of-life conditions in the community to one that continually prepares for the next CFS. After saturation, officers cease proactive policing and engage in a reactionary style of policing. The outlook becomes "Why act proactively when my actions are only going to be interrupted by a CFS?" Uncommitted time is spent waiting for the next call. Sixty percent of time spent responding to calls for service is believed to be the saturation threshold.

In general, a "Rule of 60" can be applied to evaluate patrol staffing. The "Rule of 60" has two parts. The first part maintains that 60 percent of the sworn officers in a department should be dedicated to the patrol function, and the second part maintains that no more than 60 percent of manpower should be "saturated" by workload demands from the community.

### *1. Rule of 60*

According to the GIPD "Chain of Command" report dated 10/1/2010 (updated 9/5/2011), patrol in the GIPD is staffed by one captain, nine sergeants, and forty-two police officers assigned to a CFS response capacity. These fifty-two sworn officers (sgts. and officers) represent 67.5 percent of the seventy-seven sworn officers in the GIPD. This percentage is higher than

the 60 percent benchmark for patrol staffing for an agency the size of the GIPD.

According to these statistics, the GIPD does not adhere to the first component of the "Rule of 60" and the patrol function of the agency is not staffed appropriately.

The second part of the "Rule of 60" examines workload and discretionary time and suggests that no more than 60 percent of time should be committed to calls for service. In other words, ICMA suggests that no more than 60 percent of available patrol officer time be spent responding to the service demands of the community. The remaining 40 percent of the time is the "discretionary time" for officers to be available to address community problems and be available for serious emergencies. This Rule of 60 for patrol deployment does *not* mean the remaining 40 percent of time is downtime or break time. It is simply a reflection of the point at which patrol officer time is "saturated" by CFS.

## *2. Saturation Index*

This ratio of dedicated time compared to discretionary time is referred to as the "Saturation Index" (SI). It is ICMA's contention that patrol staffing is optimally deployed when the SI is in the 60 percent range. A SI greater than 60 percent indicates that the patrol manpower is largely reactive, and overburdened with CFS and workload demands. An SI of somewhat less than 60 percent indicates that patrol manpower is optimally staffed. An SI level much lower than 60 percent, however, indicates patrol resources that are underutilized, and signals an opportunity for a reduction in patrol resources or reallocation of police personnel.

Departments must be cautious in interpreting the SI too narrowly. For example, one should not conclude that SI can never exceed 60 percent at

any time during the day, or that in any given hour no more than 60 percent of any officer's time be committed to CFS. The SI at 60 percent is intended to be a benchmark to evaluate service demands on patrol staffing. When SI levels exceed 60 percent for substantial periods of a given shift, or at isolated and specific times during the day, then decisions should be made to reallocate or realign personnel to reduce the SI to levels below 60. Lastly, this is not a hard-and-fast rule, but a benchmark to be used in evaluating staffing decisions.


The ICMA data analysis in the second part of this report provides a rich overview of CFS and staffing demands experienced by the GIPD. The analysis here looks specifically at patrol deployment and how to maximize the personnel resources of the GIPD to meet the demands of calls for service while also engaging in proactive policing to combat crime, disorder, and traffic issues in the community.

Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent the "saturation" of patrol resources in the GIPD during the two months in 2011 on which we focused. By "saturation" we mean the amount of time officers spend on patrol handling service demands from the community. In other words, how much of the day is "saturated" with workload demands. This "saturation" is the comparison of workload with available manpower over the course of an average day during the months selected.

The four figures represent the manpower and demand during weekdays and weekends during the months of February and August, 2011. Examination of these four figures permits exploration of the second part of the Rule of 60. Again, the Rule of 60 examines the relationship between total work and total patrol, and to comply with this rule, total work should be less than 60 percent of total patrol. In the context of the GIPD, both day and night patrol

platoons are staffed similarly, so the interpretation of Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 will be straightforward.

**Figure 1. Saturation Index by Hour, February 2011 Weekdays**



In the figures, the patrol resources available are denoted by the dashed green line at the top. The 100 percent value indicates the total police officer hours available during the 24-hour period. This amount varies during the day consistent with the staffing of the platoons/squads, but at any given hour the total amount of available manpower will equal 100.

The red dashed line fixed at the 60 percent level represents the saturation index (SI). As discussed above, this is the point at which patrol resources become largely reactive as CFS and workload demands consume a larger and larger portion of available time.

The blue line represents workload generated by calls for service from the public and the solid black line represents total workload experienced by the GIPD.

As can be seen in Figure 1, during weekdays in February, demand for police services in Grand Island increases from the morning hours and throughout the day, peaking through 6 p.m. For a sustained period between around 11 a.m. and 5 p.m., the SI “hugs” the 60 percent threshold. This signifies that patrol resources available during these hours are reactionary. After 5 p.m., workload as a function of available resources abates to approximately 40 percent until approximately midnight when it abates even further through the night and bottoms out at 6 a.m.

At the 40 percent level sufficient resources are available to meet demand, but the experience of patrol officers for the majority of the evening hours is they perceive their time to be strained. This coincides with anecdotal reports by officers that report heavy demands for police services for the bulk of the time in Grand Island. The data presented here confirm that during the daytime hours in February patrol resources are strained and there appears to be shortage of personnel during these times.



**Figure 2. Saturation Index by Hour, February 2011 Weekends**






Figure 2 depicts the SI of patrol resources during weekends in February 2011. Here again between the hours of approximately 11 a.m. and 3 a.m., patrol saturation approaches the 60 percent threshold and surpasses it several times (12 p.m., 8:30-9:30 p.m., 1-3 a.m.). This signifies that sufficient resources are available to meet the demands, but these resources are under considerable stress for most of the day. At 60 percent saturation, patrol resources are considered reactionary. At the levels presented here for February, patrol resources are approaching this upward limit, and while not surpassing the breaking point, they are close enough to warrant scrutiny. This finding should lead to a discussion about patrol deployment, shift structure, and workload responsibilities.

**Figure 3. Saturation Index by Hour, August 2011 Weekdays**



Patrol resources are deployed more optimally during August, but still face conditions of chronic stress. According to Figure 3, SI exceeds 60 percent on August weekdays between 2 p.m. and 5 p.m. and is at the 50 percent level from about 9 a.m. until midnight.

**Figure 4. Saturation Index by Hour, August 2011 Weekends**



And as can be seen in Figure 4, during August weekends, patrol saturation exceeds the 60 percent threshold numerous times during the day and “hugs” 50 percent for most of the day with the exception of the hours between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m. In our view, there are sufficient patrol resources to meet service demands, but the resources are under considerable stress and approach the reactionary threshold for most of the time during weekends in August.

When the SI exceeds 60 percent it is not meant to imply that police resources are not available to meet service demands. This situation would occur when the SI exceeded 100 percent during extended time periods. (An individual value of greater than 100 percent would indicate that all available resources are being used and patrol officers are assigned to multiple CFS at

one time. This would indicate a CFS backlog, with resources completely committed.) There are clearly sufficient resources available throughout the day (SI levels consistently less than 100). However, at critical and extended times during the day the 60 percent SI is passed and in all likelihood proactive patrol ceases. This is not desirable from a police personnel deployment perspective, and it is recommended that steps be taken to ameliorate this condition.

***Recommendation:***

**Create a third shift of officers (called a swing shift or impact team) who would supplement the current patrol deployment and would also engage in proactive enforcement to address crime and quality of life issues in the community.**

The recommendation ICMA offers is to create a third squad (commonly referred to as a "swing" or "impact" squad) that can bolster patrol deployment at critical times during the day. This third shift would commit personnel resources to respond to CFS **and** engage in proactive enforcement and community policing initiatives. These officers would have the same duties and responsibilities as the other platoons and be used as a resource during the times needed most when serious crime and traffic accidents are at their highest. The data analysis presented here gives a very accurate indication of the times and days of these occurrences, but a thorough and deliberate strategic analysis must be undertaken to properly identify these time periods and staff patrol resources accordingly.

The start and end times for this platoon can be determined by taking the data analysis presented here and putting it into context with the crime and traffic crash occurrences, along with the times and days of the week most conducive to proactive patrol and community problem solving. The start

time of this platoon, considering all of these variables, would likely be 12 p.m. and the end time would be 12 a.m. during weekdays, and run from 2 p.m. to 2 a.m. on weekends. Furthermore, flexibility could be built into this shift by incorporating a periodic analysis of community conditions (monthly for example), to reevaluate the appropriate start/end time that optimizes all of these conditions.

Priority should be given to deploying this swing/impact shift into the regular patrol operations seven days per week. This shift can be staffed by two sergeants and ten officers by realigning existing resources. It is further recommended that the "overlap" shift be discontinued so this "swing" shift can be created. The patrol division would then be configured as follows:

<b>SHIFT</b>	<b>TEAM</b>	<b>SERGEANTS</b>	<b>OFFICERS</b>
DAYS	A	2 (1-patrol, 1-spec. ops)	8
DAYS	B	2 (1-patrol, 1-spec. ops)	8
NIGHTS	A	2 (1-patrol, 1-spec. ops)	8
NIGHTS	B	2 (1-patrol, 1-spec. ops)	8
SWING	A	1 (patrol)	5
SWING	B	1 (patrol)	5
		10	42

This swing shift would be responsible for coverage seven days per week, and would be used to address community crime, traffic, and disorder issues from a proactive perspective as well as lend support to strained CFS resources during peak hours. Also, consistent with the GIPD "core values," providing service through community partnerships can be accomplished with this swing shift. Having a dedicated cadre of personnel working for the patrol division captain has the potential to address many of the concerns for the GIPD all at the same time.

Communities around the country are implementing what are known as “impact” teams of officers to address community problems. These teams work with the community and other units of the police department and city/state/federal officials to identify and solve community problems. These problems can range from crime, to traffic, to disorder, to schools, etc. Essentially, this approach incorporates the “S.A.R.A” process of community policing (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment) with problem-oriented policing to eliminate community problems.

Strong consideration must be given by the GIPD toward adopting this approach. Realigning existing officers and deploying them at the appropriate time, while directing their duties through a strategic plan based upon the GIPD core values, will have a substantial impact on the quality of life in Grand Island. This swing shift or “impact team” can be used as a resource to assist the CFS function of patrol and to target community problems simultaneously.

### *3. Revisiting Part I of the “Rule of 60”*

According to our analyses, reconfiguring the patrol schedules would result in staffing fifty-two sworn officers on patrol across six shifts. In the context of the Rule of 60, and considering the previous standard discussed above, fifty-two sworn officers on patrol would represent approximately 60 percent of the entire number of sworn personnel in the department. At this exact percentage, the entire department sworn personnel strength would be eighty-seven officers ( $52/.60 = 86.7$ ). It is recommended, therefore, that consideration be given to increasing sworn officer strength from its current level of seventy-seven sworn officers to appropriately balance the department in order to have sufficient staffing for both patrol and other enforcement purposes.

## **C. Special Operations**

### ***Recommendation:***

**Create a supervisory position on each shift called the special operations sergeant who will coordinate crime, traffic, and quality-of-life enforcement activities pursuant to the strategic management approach.**

Based upon the above discussion about deployment and staffing, it appears that the supervisor-to-police officer ratio patrol division is low. Presently, each shift has one sergeant assigned to supervise three or four officers. It is recommended that the span of control be increased whereby one sergeant on each shift be assigned to supervise all the officers working on that shift. This will increase the span of control to one sergeant for seven or eight officers. This supervisor-to-officer ratio is more appropriate for patrol operations. It also frees up two supervisor positions on each shift. These "extra" positions provide the GIPD an excellent opportunity to implement a strategic approach to the crime, traffic, and quality-of-life problems in the community.

As discussed above, within a strategic framework, accountability must be affixed in order to carry out the GIPD mission. It is recommended that shift sergeants be given the responsibility to execute the GIPD strategic plans on their respective shifts. While all personnel would be responsible for carrying out the plans as developed, authority and accountability for strategic implementation would rest within the newly created special operations sergeant position on each shift. Leveraging the positions created by increasing the span of control affords the GIP an opportunity to pursue strategic planning more aggressively.

Currently, each shift is composed of Team A and Team B and each team has two sergeants assigned (north and south). It is recommended that this configuration be changed so that each shift would still have Team A and Team B, with the division of labor changing from north and south to patrol and special operations. Each day, with two sergeants working, one sergeant would be responsible for patrol operations and the efficient handling of CFS, and the second sergeant would be responsible for implementation of the GIPD strategic plans.

Special operations sergeants would be given the authority to draw upon all available resources in the GIPD, including community service officers (see below), investigators, and patrol personnel to carry out enforcement activities. The special operations sergeants would also be responsible for providing crime, traffic, and quality-of-life intelligence to the officers on their respective shifts. They would report regularly to the patrol captain and chief about the quality, quantity, and results (in terms of crime reduction, traffic safety, and improved quality of life) of the enforcement efforts put forth on that shift and any recommendations for plan changes and modifications. These special operations positions, therefore, will be the driving force behind both the implementation of the department's plans as well as the instrument for evaluating the success/failure of these plans in action.

***Recommendation:***

**Increase the number of community service officers (CSOs) to six full-time positions and assign two CSOs to each tour to assist the special operations sergeants in implementing strategic plans.**

Community service officers in the GIPD are responsible for a wide array of tasks and activities, from performing administrative duties, towing vehicles,



writing parking tickets, to issuing code violations. The CSOs have become a “catch-all” resource for GIPD operations. The power and potential of these positions, however, is being neglected. Due in part to diminishing resources, the CSOs have been required to take on the numerous tasks mentioned above, and are distracted from their primary functions.

The previous discussion about social disorder and strategic planning is the perfect context for renewing and reenergizing the CSO position. These individuals should be relied upon to aggressively enforce code violations, particularly the violations considered to be underlying the crime and traffic problems in the community. It is strongly recommended that two full-time CSO positions (at a minimum) be assigned to each shift. Furthermore, these CSOs should be assigned directly to the special operations sergeant and to every extent possible relieved from performing administrative tasks. The CSOs should be directed to enforce the numerous code violations occurring in Grand Island and which are directly linked to the crime reduction and traffic safety programs being implemented by the department.

Additionally, communities around the country are implementing unique methods to deal with public nuisances. ICMA publishes reference material to assist communities to enact and execute civil nuisance laws to deal with problematic locations. In brief, nuisance laws pertaining to noise, drugs, and violence emanating from locations (particularly locations governed by licensing agencies) are created and enforced. Enforcement of these laws gives the police and other regulatory authorities additional tools to close problematic locations or force them to abide by expected norms. There have been numerous successes around the nation to bring civil nuisance statutes to bear against problems of drugs, abandoned property, unruly bars and night clubs, etc. Grand Island and the GIPD should enact similar statutes and use them to police unwanted nuisances. The CSOs, under the direction and supervision of the special operations sergeants, should be the

enforcement arm of these nuisance initiatives, directing enforcement activities at problematic locations and establishments.

***Recommendation:***

**Create a robust crime prevention program and staff a dedicated, sworn position of crime prevention officer**

One of the important performance measures used to evaluate the effectiveness of a police department is the extent to which it assists the community in its own self-protection. Commonly referred to as "crime prevention," modern police departments engage in numerous programs designed to help the community protect itself against crime and stay safe on the roads. General (towards the entire community) and specific (towards at-risk people or places) crime prevention and traffic safety programs must be developed and implemented in Grand Island. Below is a brief list of various programs in these areas that must be explored by the GIPD:

Crime Prevention

- Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)
- Drug Abuse Resistance Education
- VIN etching
- Personal property identification programs
- Residential and commercial burglary security survey
- Personal protection classes.

Driver Safety

- DWI awareness (MADD and/or SADD)
- Motorcycle safety
- Car seat programs

- STREET-SMARTS traffic safety education program.

The above is not meant to be a comprehensive list of programs, but a sample of what other communities are offering to reduce crime and improve traffic safety. The bottom line for Grand Island and the GIPD is that the problematic conditions should be identified and plans created to eliminate those conditions, AND community awareness and education must be an integral part of those plans. For example, if burglary is considered a crime problem, then burglary awareness and property protection must be a component of the strategy to reduce burglary. If DWI is contributing to traffic accidents and injuries, DWI awareness and education must be an integral part of the strategy to reduce accidents and injuries caused by driving under the influence of alcohol.

#### **D. Criminal Investigations Division**

The criminal investigations division (CID) is a full-service investigative division. The division is responsible for the investigation of all crimes and intelligence gathering for the police department. The investigators investigate all crimes, including both felonies and misdemeanors, where there are investigative leads present. The division captain receives all of the investigative reports daily, and reviews them to make a determination as to the solvability of these offenses. If there are investigative leads present the captain assigns these cases to the investigators. The cases that are not assigned are held pending any new information that might become available.

The criminal investigations division is staffed as follows:

- One captain
- One sergeant
- Seven investigators assigned to general crime investigations

- Two investigators assigned to the child protection safety unit
- One sergeant and two investigators assigned to the Central Nebraska Drug and Safe Streets Task Force
- One evidence and property officer (a sworn police officer position)
- One evidence technician (civilian)

Thus, total personnel are fourteen police officer positions and one civilian position.

Members of the criminal investigations division work a four-day work week with ten-hour shift assignments. One investigator is assigned to work on Saturday and one investigator is assigned to work on Sunday. The remaining investigators work during the week. All of the investigators work daytime hours.

The division has no analyst or clerical staff. The investigators utilize the task force analyst and clerk to assist them in research and subpoena processing. This work can be done on a very limited basis when the analyst's and clerk's work does not conflict with the task force workload. The absence of a civilian clerk position does cause additional burdens to be placed on the investigators, as they are required to handle non-police tasks.

There is a significant amount of work that could be handled by a civilian, thus allowing the investigators to spend more time investigating crimes. It appears from a review of operations that the division has the appropriate number of sworn personnel. ICMA would recommend that if additional personnel are to be considered a civilian clerk and or a police analyst should be the first consideration prior to adding investigator position(s).

The criminal investigations division does not maintain records of the cases solved by the investigators. This makes it impossible to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the individual investigators relating to their

case clearance rate. The department does track the crime clearance rate of the entire department. All departments nationwide are required to report crime statistics to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in their annual submission of a Uniform Crime Report (UCR). These statistics do not require clearance statistics for individual investigative units. In addition to not tracking the clearance rates for the individual investigators the division does not have easily accessible information on the case assignments of individual investigators. This information is available, but only through time-consuming research. This information should be reviewed routinely by supervisors to aid in the evaluation of the investigators and to more effectively manage case assignments.

The only data readily available for review was the number of open cases currently being worked by the investigators. This information alone is not sufficient to make conclusions as to the appropriate number of investigators that should be assigned to the division. It does appear that the division has sufficient personnel to handle the level of service expected by the community.

It was noted that the investigators have excellent equipment and working conditions. The investigators do not have take-home vehicles. Supervisors and members of specialized units are permitted to take police vehicles to and from work. The police facility and the space allocated to the investigations division add much to the ability of the investigators to work and is an important positive morale factor within the division.

***Recommendations:***

**Take immediate steps to implement a case management system that allows GIPD investigative supervisors to track investigations by individual investigator as well as monitor the clearance rates of the**

**unit as a whole. These are essential pieces of information needed to evaluate the effectiveness of investigative efforts. The failure to track these data is problematic and needs to be addressed immediately.**

**Staff the criminal investigations division with one permanent civilian staff member to assist in the administration and management of the division.**

**Staff the criminal investigations division with one permanent civilian staff member assigned to criminal intelligence and crime analysis.**

**Review protocols for crime scene investigations.**

## **E. Special Investigations**

### *1. South Central Alliance of Law Enforcement Services (SCALES)*

The Grand Island Police Department is a member of the South Central Alliance of Law Enforcement Services (SCALES). The members of this organization are law enforcement agencies that are contiguous to the city of Grand Island and are located in central Nebraska. Members of the organization work together and supply investigative assistance in the investigations of major cases, protracted investigations, and cases of officer-involved shootings.

### *2. The Central Nebraska Drug and Safe Street Task Force*

The Grand Island Police Department is a member of the Central Nebraska Drug and Safe Streets Task Force. Task force operation is partially funded through a federal grant program focused on drug- and gang-related crimes. The Grand Island Police Department is joined in this investigative effort by the FBI, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Nebraska

State Patrol, and the Hall County Sheriff's Department. The Grand Island Police Department does not have a dedicated drug investigations unit. All drug- and gang-related crime complaints and intelligence information received by the department is forwarded to the task force for follow-up and investigation.

This task force's operations are run from an off-site location. The Grand Island Police Department is responsible for the salaries of the sergeant and the two investigators permanently assigned to the operation. A third investigator that works at the police department is assigned as a liaison officer between the task force and the police department. This investigator works closely with the task force, but is also assigned investigations not related to the task force operations. The federal grant pays for cell phones, rental vehicles, office rental, investigative expense money, and a limited amount of overtime.

The following information was obtained from records of the task force for activity for all of 2010 and up to date through October 2011.

	2010	2011
Cases	189	149
Arrests	135	78
Purchases		
Methamphetamine	1107g	731g
Cocaine	3902g	0g
Marijuana	13056g	381g
Pharmaceuticals	25 pills	100pills
Guns	6	0
Seizures		
Methamphetamine	5325g	344g
Cocaine	3902g	0g
Marijuana	12760g	2331g
Pharmaceuticals	38 pills	100 pills
Marijuana Plants	8	5
Mushrooms	0	27
Vehicles	24	4
Cash	\$2,636	\$16,252

By all accounts these special investigative units provide an excellent resource for the GIPD. The ability to leverage partnerships in the law enforcement community and focus the efforts of these partnerships on the drugs, gangs, and violence in Grand Island are essential. ICMA recommends that these units continue to operate under the current conditions to combat crime and drugs as currently constituted.

### *3. Child Abuse and Missing Juvenile Unit*

The department has two investigator positions permanently assigned to the child protection safety unit. These investigators are assigned to work with county and state child protection personnel at an off-site location. They investigate all crimes against children that occur in the schools and other locations within the city.



## Case Statistics

### 2010 Officer Dvorak

- 197 total cases
  - seventeen cases cleared with arrest or referral for prosecution
  - ten cases have no clearance
- 109 child abuse cases
  - ten cases cleared with an arrest or referral for prosecution
  - two cases have no clearance

### 2011 Jan-Sept Officer Dvorak

- 147 total cases
  - ten cases cleared with arrest or referral for prosecution
  - five cases have no clearance
- 112 child abuse cases
  - seven cases cleared with arrest or referral for prosecution
  - two cases have no clearance

### 2010 Officer Mann

- 181 total cases
  - Twenty-one cases cleared with an arrest or referral for prosecution
  - Ten cases have no clearance
- 105 child abuse cases
  - ten cases with an arrest or referral for prosecution
  - All cleared

### 2011 Jan-Sept Officer Mann

- Thirty-seven total cases
  - Three cases with an arrest or referral for prosecution

- One has no clearance
- Seventeen child abuse cases
  - Two cases with an arrest or referral for prosecution
  - All cleared

#### *4. Crime Scene / Property and Evidence Management*

The Grand Island Police Department's crime scene unit is responsible for securely storing found and unclaimed property, evidence processing, and evidence storage. The unit is staffed by one sworn police officer and one civilian clerk. The unit is responsible for responding to and processing crime scenes. They are also responsible for examining and storing evidence collected by officers during their investigations. The civilian clerk is also responsible for all video evidence retention, driving under the influence evidentiary tapes, and surveillance video evidence.

A visit to the evidence and property storage facility revealed a modern, well-managed work and storage area. The property and evidence stored within the facility was secure and well maintained. The bar code system that is currently in use was easy to access and efficient for retrieving property or evidence. The bar code system operates as part of the Spillman Technologies computer system. It was also noted that drug evidence, jewelry, and guns were retained in secure individual locations. The cash that is held by the facility is either in a secure vault or deposited in an appropriate account at a local bank that handles city accounts.

During any study of enhancing responses to major crimes the crime scene unit must be part of the discussion. These highly trained individuals have a great deal to offer in protracted and complex cases. Getting them involved early and with sufficient resources will add a great deal to the criminal investigation and the potential for clearing these cases in an efficient and

timely manner. Management should review the option of expanding the crime scene operations to allow them to respond quickly and devote more time to assisting the investigators throughout the course of the investigation. These positions can be filled with civilians at a lower cost without sacrificing efficiency.

Considering that the unit is being operated with a minimum number of personnel, this is an excellent operation. The crime scene/property management section has an excellent work environment, sufficient space, and excellent equipment. The personnel are well trained and understand their role within the organization.

There were no deficiencies noted, but consideration should be given to civilianizing the sworn officer in this position and staffing the evidence/crime scene function with two civilian evidence technicians.

## **VI. Administrative & Personnel**

The administration division provides a wide range of services and programs within the police department. The division is supervised and managed by a captain. The following are the division's responsibilities:

- Personnel management (recruitment, hiring, background investigations)
- Working in conjunction with the city's human resource department the division maintains an active police and civilian recruiting program.

The staffing of the division is as follows:

- One captain (division commander)
- One sergeant (training coordinator, school resource officers program)
- One sergeant (fleet manager, community service officers program)
- One police officer (desk officer/public information officer)
- Five school resource officers
- One office manager
- Two data entry clerks
- Two administrative clerks
- One quality control/data entry clerk
- One administrative clerk (sixteen hours with the police department, twenty-four hours with task force)
- Five part-time community service officers (two vacancies)
- One maintenance supervisor
- Two part-time custodians
- One victim witness coordinator.

Total personnel therefore are nine sworn police officers, nine full-time civilians and seven part-time civilians.

Several recommendations are offered below with respect to operations and personnel staffing in this division.

***Recommendation:***

**Consideration should be given to folding the administration division into the criminal investigations division, transferring oversight of administrative functions to the captain in charge of criminal investigations, and eliminating one captain position in the agency.**

ICMA contends that the GIPD would be more appropriately structured with two divisions, with one responsible for patrol operations and one responsible for investigations and administration. Each division would be commanded by a captain. Currently, the administration division has limited sworn personnel assigned and the ratio of captain to sergeant is 1:2. A captain could easily handle greater responsibility and oversee a greater share of the department's functions. To broaden managerial oversight and streamline operations, it is recommended that the GIPD staff two captain positions and distribute managerial responsibility accordingly.

The next section of the report discusses the various administrative, support, and personnel functions of the department.

**A. Training/School Resource Unit**

The training/school resource unit is supervised and managed by a sergeant. He is responsible for all of the training in the department, plus in-service training, pre-employment testing, interviews, and background checks for new hires.

The training sergeant is responsible for one police officer position assigned to the front desk, and is also in charge of the school resource officers.

In terms of training, the State of Nebraska does not have a minimum number of hours of required training annually. However, the state does require officers to qualify annually with their firearms.

The Grand Island Police Department provides twenty hours of training within the department annually, including:

- Four hours of firearms qualification (this meets the state requirement)
- Four hours of defensive tactics
- Four hours of general training with varying topics
- Fifteen minutes per month of roll call training during working hours.

The officers are paid for the training overtime at a straight time rate as agreed upon in the union contract.

The training/school resource sergeant is also in charge of the department's special weapons and tactics team.

Five police officers are assigned to the school resource officer program. They cover fourteen elementary schools, three middle schools, and one high school, all public schools operated by the Grand Island Public Schools. The school resource program is funded jointly by the Grand Island Public school system and city, with each contributing half of the officers' salaries, benefits, and equipment.

The officers are responsible for the following assignments:

- Teaching gang resistance education in all fourteen elementary schools
- Handling all criminal complaints that occur in or around the schools
- Working one day per week with the child abuse unit, assisting in the investigations of child abuse cases

- Handling all complaints involving unruly students at Success Academy. This school is an alternative education facility.
- Teaching all bicycle safety classes in the schools.

The officers have assigned offices in the upper-level schools. There is one officer assigned to each of the three middle schools, and there are two officers assigned to the high school.

The school resource officers maintain high visibility on the grounds of their assigned schools. They maintain positive relationships with the school staff members as well as the students. These relationships contribute to the information flow into the police department, which assists in identifying law enforcement issues of concern and other intelligence gathering. This aids in the prevention of crime and the solving of crimes.

During the summer months when school is not in session, four of the school resource officers are assigned to patrol operations. The fifth officer is assigned full-time to the child abuse unit.

The supervisory relationship between the administrative sergeant and the school officers is cumbersome at best. The heavy administrative demands placed on the sergeant make it difficult to visit and oversee officers in the schools. From an operational perspective it would make more sense to transfer the supervisory responsibility of the SROs to day-shift supervisors.

## **B. Code Enforcement and Fleet Management**

Currently, the GIPD staffs a supervisory position responsible for overseeing the community service officers responsible for code enforcement and other sundry tasks. This supervisor is also in charge of fleet management and other administrative duties that are necessary.

As discussed above, ICMA believes the role of code enforcement is essential to the successful execution of crime strategies and should be rooted firmly in patrol operations. Therefore, personnel assigned to this sergeant should be transferred and sited organizationally in the patrol division under the special operations sergeants (also an appropriate supervisory location for SROs).

### **C. Desk Officer**

The desk officer works Monday through Friday. He is responsible for handling walk-in complaints, firearm permit applications, and acts as a public information officer supplying information to the media. This position, while essential, should be performed by a civilian employee, and this officer returned to patrol or another operational assignment within the department.

### **D. Victim Witness Program**

The department has a victim witness coordinator who works within the police department and has the following responsibilities:

- Assisting victims and witnesses in making court appearances, court hearings, and related meetings
- Referring victims and witnesses to other agencies for assistance
- Working with the prosecutor's office on issues relating to victims and witnesses
- Working with police officers and assisting them with court preparation and appearances
- Assisting with grant writing and the administration of the grants that are awarded



This victim witness program is mostly grant funded through the State Of Nebraska Crime Commission. The city is responsible for 20 percent and the grant pays for 80 percent of the operation.

### **E. 911 Operations Center**

The City of Grand Island and Hall County have located their joint emergency management/communications center within the Grand Island City Hall. The operations of the center and the participation of the member agencies are established in an interlocal cooperation agreement. The Grand Island Police department and the Hall County Sheriff's Department are the only two law enforcement agencies utilizing the communication and 911 services provided by the center. The center also serves seven fire departments and five EMS departments.

The 911 Operations Center is funded partially by special revenue collected through a surcharge on phone bills paid by the customers in the police and fire service territories. This revenue pays one-third of the cost to operate the center. The remaining two-thirds of the cost is divided evenly between the Grand Island Police Department and the Hall County Sheriff's Department. The total budget from all sources for emergency management and communications is \$1.4 million.

The 911 Operations Center is supervised by a joint committee consisting of the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Hall County, the Mayor of the City of Grand Island, two members of the Grand Island City Council, and two members of the Hall County Board of Supervisors. This joint committee is responsible for recommending and providing policy direction, and serving as the advisory committee which governs operation of the center. The committee also recommends a budget to the Board of Supervisors for Hall County and the City Council of Grand Island. In the event the members of

the joint committee shall fail to agree as to any matter, this matter shall be submitted to the Board of Supervisors and the City Council for determination, advising the mayor of opposition or action.

The 911 phone equipment located within the center is six years old. A purchase of new and updated equipment is expected in the current fiscal year. The radio consoles and furniture used in the center were replaced in 2008. The police department is responsible for the purchase of its own hand held radio units as well as the in-car radios.

All of the employees working at the center are employed and paid by the city of Grand Island. The employees working in the center are as follows:

- Emergency Management Director
- Deputy Director
- Emergency management coordinator (clerical assistant and training)
- Three supervisors (one assigned to each shift)
- Twelve dispatchers. The dispatchers work eight-hour shifts, with two days off per week. Three dispatchers per shift is the most desirable staffing level, although operations can be handled with two. This allows some flexibility for vacations and other leave situations.

The 911 Operations Center handles approximately 50,000 911 calls for service annually. The Center also handles an additional 140,000 nonemergency calls. It also manages 350 alarm accounts that generate \$90,000 per year in revenue.

### *1. Dispatcher Training*

All dispatchers attend two weeks of basic training after they are hired. They then are placed into an in-service training program in the communications center. The dispatchers then attend the National Academy for Emergency

Management Dispatchers. This is a three-day training program at a regional training site in either Lincoln or Omaha.

## *2. Staffing*

The dispatchers work forty-hour work weeks that require eight hours per shift to cover the three shifts per day. Management has attempted to assign three or four dispatchers to the more active shifts, indicating that four dispatchers per shift is the most desirable staffing, particularly during the shifts with high call volume.

There are times that there are only two dispatchers on duty, and management believes that this is not acceptable for long periods of time. The executive director cited the "Erlane Study" obtained from the National Emergency Number Association (NENA); this study's guidelines indicate that his staffing level is low when the operations center is staffed at three dispatchers. In order for ICMA to provide an opinion on this situation, a more detailed study of the operation will be necessary.

Our analysis lead us to believe that the current staffing level provides the necessary personnel to cover the three eight-hour shift assignments. Additional staff increases are not critical to the performance of the communications center. However, the Emergency Management Director does believe that his operations are understaffed and will need additional positions sooner rather than later.

### ***Recommendation:***

**Empanel a joint committee on communications comprised of representatives from all agencies to discuss staffing, call taking, response, and emergency management issues.**

A joint committee of the city and the county should meet and discuss the issue of staffing with the management team of the emergency management/communications center. The committee should review the staffing levels of the shifts and seek input from the dispatchers, police, firefighters, and EMS personnel. The joint committee can then determine if further study is warranted.

The emergency management director, the chief of police, the sheriff, and the city administrator should schedule regular meetings to discuss matters of mutual interest involving the emergency management/communications center. An agenda should be prepared prior to the meetings so participants can have time prepare for these discussions. A summary of these meetings should be sent to the members of the joint committee and the other agencies that utilize the center's dispatch services. Communications between all of the users of the system is becoming increasingly important.

The consolidation of services such as emergency management and communications has worked very well for Grand Island and Hall County. The city and county should be proud of this operation and the dedicated professionals that work there. The communications personnel are well trained and understand the critical importance of their role in the safety of the personnel that they dispatch and to the public they are serving. The equipment that is utilized is in excellent condition and is updated and replaced as required. The director and his management team have done an excellent job of providing quality service. They continue to explore new technology and ways to implement new equipment and training into the operation as resources become available.

## **F. Report Writing**

During the ICMA analysis a substantial amount of discontent was reported by the officers about the manual report writing system in place in the GIPD. The department is currently evolving out of handwritten reports towards an automated system of report taking/writing. This is a positive step and continued progress must be made in this area. Technology is available that would permit the department to automate the entire process from beginning to end. This will improve record keeping, would improve the ability to search records, and would save time and costs. It is recommended that the department continue to explore automated report-writing alternatives and embrace the continued evolution from the hand-written system.

The chief of police indicated that the current reporting system has been in place for the past two or three years and was an attempt to get police reports completed in a more timely manner. He also indicated that this system allows the officers to provide a copy of the report and case number to the person making the report immediately upon completion of the first contact with the report taker. The chief also stated that the reports are much more uniform in their content and preparation. He acknowledged that this is not a long-range solution and is currently forming a committee within the department to study the reporting system and determine what options are available.

The police department currently utilizes the Spillman computer system as a shared user system. The technology to implement a field reporting system is available but implementation will require system changes and upgrades. The idea of introducing hand-held technologies does have some promise and should be explored.

### ***Recommendations:***

**The police department and the city should take immediate steps to determine what is needed to implement a field reporting system for the department. A portable, in-car system is needed to obtain higher quality reports in a more efficient and timely manner. Undertaking this project has widespread support within the department and within the city leadership.**

### **G. Leadership within the Department**

Leadership of the Grand Island Police Department is experienced, well-educated, and well-trained. The department has excellent leadership depth. The members of the department have respect for departmental leaders, adhere to their policies and directives, support management initiatives, and generally work toward achieving sound law enforcement objectives.

Leaders have attained the following formal education and specialized training:

- The chief of police has received a bachelor's and master's degree and has graduated from the FBI's National Academy.
- The criminal investigations division Captain has received a bachelor's degree and has graduated from the FBI's National Academy
- The patrol division captain has received a bachelor's and master's degree and has graduated from the FBI's National Academy.
- The administration division captain has received a bachelor's and master's degree and has graduated from the FBI's National Academy.

As one can see, the department has three captains who have prepared themselves well to assume advanced leadership roles if and when opportunity for further advancement presents itself. The police department

should continue to promote and encourage higher education for its officers. Due to the fact that there are no lieutenant positions in the organization, the sergeants should be afforded advanced training opportunities to prepare them for future leadership roles.

***Recommendation:***

**Institute a formal leadership development program for midlevel supervisors to ensure future leadership excellence within the GIPD.**

**H. Equipment, Vehicles and Facility**

The following items were viewed and their condition evaluated as part of the department analysis:

*1. Vehicles*

The department has one police sergeant handling all of the fleet management within the department. The sergeant handles maintenance issues with all police vehicles. He also assists in the purchase and equipment needs of the vehicles.

All vehicles, both marked and unmarked, were a recent or current model year. The vehicles were well maintained. The marked patrol vehicles are equipped with in-car camera systems, mounted radios, emergency lights and sirens, and in-car computers. The vehicles were clean inside and out. The department does not have a take-home car program. The marked patrol vehicles are shared among the officers. There are a limited number of vehicles that are classified as take-home vehicles. The school resource officers, task force investigators, child abuse investigators, evidence officer, and staff officers are permitted to take vehicles to and from their residences.

## *2. Firearms*

The department issues .45 caliber Glock auto pistols to all sworn police officers. Patrol officers are issued the Glock 21 and investigators are issued the Glock 30. The department also has AR-15 semi-automatic rifles available to the patrol officers and for other special operations. The department has a special weapons and tactics team that has other specialized arms available when needed. The department has an excellent inventory of firearms.

The department provides excellent equipment for the members of the department. In the interviews with the department members there were no complaints about the department's commitment to provide the most modern and up-to-date equipment available. The members of the department recognize this and appreciate the city's commitment to provide the necessary tools to accomplish their mission.

## *3. Facility*

The department employs a maintenance supervisor two part-time custodians to handle the maintenance of the police building. These employees handle the daily routine maintenance of the building as well minor repairs.

The department is located in a modern, well-constructed police facility. The building contains 43,000 square feet of office space. The Hall County Sheriff shares the office building with the police department. The facility has sufficient space to handle the operational needs of both the sheriff's department and the city police. The building contains public meeting spaces; a well-planned evidence storage facility; large locker rooms; workout facility; jail booking facility (not currently in use); briefing rooms; conference rooms; very functional patrol operations areas; very functional criminal investigations area, including monitored interview rooms; large, enclosed garage areas for police vehicles; large, enclosed, and secure



evidence processing and vehicle examination area; a large, well-lit area utilized by the records clerks as office space and records retention; and other offices used by other administrative staff members.

This police facility is an excellent example of a modern, well-planned police operations building. The building was constructed in anticipation of the future growth of the city and the police department, and the building will serve the department for many years in the future. The location of the building is also very important as it is located directly across the street from the county jail. This location eliminates many of the logistical problems that the department might otherwise experience with the booking of prisoners and access to inmates for investigative purposes.

## **I. Computer Technology**

The police department utilizes a Spillman Technologies, Inc. computer system that is owned and also utilized by the Hall County Sheriff's Department. The police department pays an annual fee to the sheriff's department to access the system. The system operates all computers and computer operations for the department, including the department's in-car mobile data terminals. The computer system is supported by the city's information technology support personnel. The department has a very positive relationship with the Spillman staff and is very satisfied with the professional relationship that has been established between the city and the company. The emergency management/communications center also uses the Spillman system as does the county jail operated by Hall County.

## **J. Internal Investigations**

Internal investigations are assigned to the captain of the division in which the involved officer or civilian employee is assigned. When the complaint is received, the complaint and the support documentation are given to the division captain. After the material is reviewed, it is assigned to a sergeant within the division. At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigation and findings are returned to the captain. The captain and chief of police review the investigation. If the chief and captain agree with the findings, the case is concluded with the implementation of the recommendations. If the findings are not acceptable, the case is sent back to the sergeant for further investigation.

Investigations that were sustained and where discipline is imposed are retained as part of the employee's permanent personnel file and retained in the city personnel office. In addition, the administration division captain retains all of these investigative files in hard copy form. He also retains a summary of the investigation in electronic form. In compliance with state law, some of these documents can be purged after three years. The division captain reviews these cases routinely to make that determination.

In some cases where officers or employees are involved as subjects of the investigation, the department has used the Nebraska State Patrol investigators to handle these investigations.

The current procedure for handling internal investigations is working well for the department. During the focus group discussions with members of the department there were no negative comments regarding the administration's handling of internal affairs investigations.

***Recommendation:***

**The department should consider designating investigative capacity to coordinate all internal investigations.**

The department might be better served if a small cadre of investigators handled all internal investigations. This would allow for specialized training for the investigator(s), limited access to sensitive files, and a more consistent and timely process.

**K. Labor-Management Relations**

Sound labor relations are important to a well-managed organization and a motivated workforce. ICMA met with representatives from the GIPD employee association to get a better understanding of labor-management climate in Grand Island. Like most communities in the United States, Grand Island is experiencing economic difficulties and these difficulties naturally have an impact on labor negotiations with the police employee association. There was a recognition of this reality, and while discontent was raised with the actual process, there was an equal awareness of a sound relationship between the chief of police, the management of the GIPD, and the employee representatives.

**L. Rules, Regulations, Policies, and Procedures**

ICMA reviewed the GIPD's rules, regulations, policies, and procedure manuals and found that the documents provide direction and guidance to the police officers and civilians in the department. An extensive review of each procedure is beyond the scope of this report. Examination of the most critical and frequent police policies and procedures reveal that the GIPD has

thorough and comprehensive policies in these critical areas and they are consistent with respect to acceptable industry standards.

The departmental policy statements that provide clear direction for department members in high liability situations are critical. This directly impacts the safety of the police officers and the public they serve. The second issue that is of concern is the city's exposure to civil liability. As part of the ICMA analysis of police operations, nine policies were selected and reviewed.

#### Police Vehicle Pursuits

Policy #02705, Effective: August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

#### Deadly Force and Use of Weapons

Policy #02701, Effective: August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

#### Less-Than Lethal Force

Policy #02703, Effective August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

#### Officer-Involved Shootings

Policy #02511, Effective August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

### Hate Crimes

Policy #02509, Effective August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

### Domestic Violence

Policy #02507, Effective August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

### Investigation of Complaints Against an Officer

Policy #M1205, Effective August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

### Emergency Protective Custody

Policy #02313, Effective August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

### Hostage/Suicidal Person/ Barricaded Subject

Policy #02315, Effective August 2009

There were no deficiencies noted in this policy. This policy is appropriate and clearly describes the required conduct.

ICMA reviewed GIPD policies on the use of force, domestic violence, vehicle pursuits, prisoner processing, and complaints against police officers. In general, these policies are current and accurately reflect current laws and

accepted industry standards in these critical areas. The GIPD should be commended for adhering to such high standards and promulgating appropriate and relevant policies.

## **VII. Summary**

The Grand Island Police Department is a professional police agency that provides excellent service to the community. The result of the ICMA study indicates the addition of personnel is necessary in several key areas.

It is also recommended that the GIPD embrace a rigorous process of strategic planning for major elements of operations. These plans should be comprehensive and engage all levels of the organization from patrol, to criminal investigations, to administration, and should focus on the high-crime conditions in the community.

It is recommended that the GIPD be organized into two major divisions, each headed by a captain. The first division would be the patrol operations division and would be responsible for coordinating uniformed patrol operations from reactive (CFS response) and proactive (specialized enforcement driven by intelligence and strategic plans) approaches. The second division would be the investigations and administration division, and would be responsible for all the investigative, administrative, and support functions of the organization. These two divisions would complement each other, provide better organizational balance, and better position the GIPD to provide excellent police services to the Grand Island community.

Embracing and adopting these recommendations will undoubtedly advance the GIPD from its current position to a more balanced and efficient organization.

## **VIII. Data Analysis**

This data analysis on police patrol operations for Grand Island, Nebraska, report focuses on three main areas: workload, deployment, and response times. These three areas are related almost exclusively to patrol operations, which constitute a significant portion of the police department's personnel and financial commitment.

The majority of the first section of the report, concluding with Table 9, uses the call and activity data for the entire year. For the detailed workload analysis and the response-time analysis, we use two four-week sample periods. The first period is from January 31 to February 27, 2011, or winter, and the second is August 2011 (August 1 to August 28), or summer.



## A. Workload Analysis

As with similar cases around the country, we encountered a number of issues when analyzing the dispatch data. We made assumptions and decisions to address these issues. We describe the issues, assumptions, and decisions below.

- A moderate percentage (3 percent, or approximately 1,740) of events involving patrol units showed less than thirty seconds of time spent on scene. We call this zero time on scene.
- Due to the daily shift structure, we lacked the first 7 hours of CAD data for September 7, 2010. This only affects the third or fourth decimal digit of a few calculations.
- The computer software generates a large number of event codes. This led to 161 different event descriptions, which we reduced to fifteen categories for our tables and nine categories for our figures.
- A significant proportion of events, approximately 7,000 events for the year, involving patrol units were missing arrival times. These events were still included in our workload analysis, but were not used when estimating average response times.
- Most records that contained arrival times did not have unit dispatch times. Normally, we can divide response time into two components based upon when the unit is dispatched. The first is called "dispatch delay" and the second is "travel time". **In the future, unit dispatch times should be recorded carefully.**
- We wanted to include a record of officers' out-of-service activities. We created records for each out-of-service activity that we could identify within the CAD system and added them to the regular incidents.

Our study team has often worked with many of these problems with event data in other jurisdictions. To identify events that were canceled en route,

we assumed zero time on scene to account for a significant portion of them. As stated, any event with an on-scene time of less than thirty seconds was labeled zero time on scene. We used the data's source field to identify patrol-initiated activities. Any event whose source was listed as "O" – "On scene," was considered self-initiated.

When we analyze a set of dispatch records, we go through a series of steps that we detail as follows.

- We first process the data to improve its accuracy. For example, we remove duplicate units recorded on a single event. In addition, we remove records that do not indicate an actual activity. We also remove incomplete data. This includes situations where there is not enough time information to evaluate the record.
- At this point, we have a series of records that we call "events." We identify these events in three ways.
  - We distinguish between patrol and nonpatrol units.
  - We assign a category to each event based upon its description.
  - We indicate whether the call is "zero time on scene," "police-initiated," or "other-initiated."
- Finally, we remove all records that do not involve a patrol unit to get a total number of patrol-related **events**.
  - We focus on a smaller group of events designed to represent actual **calls** for service by removing all events with no officer time spent on scene, along with out-of-service activities.

In this way, we first identify a total number of records, and then limit ourselves to patrol events, and finally focus on calls for service.

To briefly review the data received, in the period from September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2011, there were approximately 33,800 dispatch events recorded by the dispatch center. Of that total, roughly 31,900 included an adequate record of a patrol unit as either the primary or secondary unit. We also included approximately 18,100 out-of-service activities.


In the period from September 2010 to August 2011, the police department reported an average of 137 events for service per day. As mentioned, 3.5 percent of these events (4.8 per day) showed no unit time spent on the call.

In the following pages we show two types of data: activity and workload. The activity levels are measured by the average number of calls per day, broken down by the type and origin of the calls, and categorized by the nature of the calls (e.g., crime, traffic). Workloads are measured in average work hours per day.

We routinely used fifteen call categories for tables and nine categories for our graphs. These are shown in the following chart.

<b>Table Categories</b>	<b>Figure Categories</b>
Accidents	Traffic
Traffic enforcement	
Alarm	Investigations
Check/investigation	
Animal calls	General noncriminal
Miscellaneous	
Assist other agency	Assist other agency
Crime-persons	Crime
Crime-property	
Disturbance	Suspicious incident
Suspicious person/vehicle	
Juvenile	Juvenile
Out of service	Out of service
Prisoner-arrest	Arrest
Prisoner-transport	

**Figure 5. Percentage Events per Day, by Initiator**



**Note:** Percentages are based on a total of 50,065 events.


**Table 2. Events per Day, by Initiator**

Initiator	Total Events	Events per Day
Zero on scene	1,735	4.8
Police-initiated	27,500	75.3
Other-initiated	20,830	57.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>50,065</b>	<b>137.2</b>

Observations:

- Three percent of the events had zero time on scene.
- Fifty-five percent of all events were police-initiated.
- Forty-two percent of all events were other-initiated.
- There was an average of 137 events per day, or 5.7 per hour.

**Figure 6. Percentage Events per Day, by Category**



**Note:** The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description on page 91.


**Table 3. Events per Day, by Category**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total Events</b>	<b>Events per Day</b>
Accidents	2,090	5.7
Alarm	1,490	4.1
Animal calls	98	0.3
Assist other agency	576	1.6
Check/investigation	4,386	12.0
Crime-persons	2,737	7.5
Crime-property	3,714	10.2
Disturbance	2,391	6.6
Juvenile	1,455	4.0
Miscellaneous	1,587	4.3
Out of service	18,145	49.7
Prisoner-arrest	666	1.8
Prisoner-transport	19	0.1
Suspicious person/vehicle	2,170	5.9
Traffic enforcement	8,541	23.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>50,065</b>	<b>137.2</b>

Observations:

- The top three categories (out of service, traffic, and crime) accounted for 70 percent of events.
- Thirty-six percent of events were out-of-service activities.
- Twenty-four percent of events were traffic-related.
- Thirteen percent of events were crime-related.
- Out-of-service events were more than a third of all events. These are removed when we examine calls for service starting with the next figure and table.

**Figure 7. Percentage Calls per Day, by Category**



**Note:** The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description on page 91.



**Table 4. Calls per Day, by Category**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total Calls</b>	<b>Calls per Day</b>
Accidents	1,996	5.5
Alarm	1,446	4.0
Animal calls	90	0.2
Assist other agency	544	1.5
Check/investigation	4,217	11.6
Crime-persons	2,655	7.3
Crime-property	3,527	9.7
Disturbance	2,287	6.3
Juvenile	1,415	3.9
Miscellaneous	1,445	4.0
Prisoner-arrest	649	1.8
Prisoner-transport	18	0.0
Suspicious person/vehicle	2,093	5.7
Traffic enforcement	8,380	23.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>30,762</b>	<b>84.3</b>


Methodology:

We focus here on recorded calls rather than recorded events. This means we removed events with zero time on scene and out-of-service events.

Observations:

- There were eighty-four calls per day, or 3.5 per hour.
- The top three categories (traffic, crime, and investigations) accounted for 72 percent of calls.
- Thirty-four percent of calls were traffic-related (enforcements and accidents).
- Twenty percent of calls were crime-related.
- Eighteen percent of calls were investigations (alarms and checks).

**Figure 8. Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months**




**Table 5. Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months**

Initiator	Sep-Oct	Nov-Dec	Jan-Feb	Mar-Apr	May-Jun	Jul-Aug
Police-initiated	26.2	26.4	22.3	23.5	34.7	30.0
Other-initiated	59.8	51.3	48.6	53.3	63.6	65.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>86.0</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>70.9</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>98.3</b>	<b>95.3</b>

Observations:

- The number of calls per day was smallest in January–February 2011.
- The number of calls per day was largest in May–June 2011.
- The months with the most calls had 39 percent more calls than the months with the fewest calls.
- For police-initiated calls, the period May–June 2011 had the most calls, with 55 percent more than the period of January–February 2011, which had the fewest.
- On the other hand, the period of July–August 2011 had the most other-initiated calls, with 34 percent more than the period of January–February 2011, which had the fewest.

**Figure 9. Calls per Day, by Category and Months**



**Note:** The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description on page 91.

**Table 6. Calls per Day, by Category and Months**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Sep- Oct</b>	<b>Nov- Dec</b>	<b>Jan- Feb</b>	<b>Mar- Apr</b>	<b>May -Jun</b>	<b>Jul- Aug</b>
Accidents	5.5	5.8	6.6	5.0	5.1	4.8
Alarm	4.1	4.0	3.1	3.4	4.5	4.6
Animal Calls	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4
Assist other agency	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.8	1.4
Check/investigation	11.8	10.1	10.2	10.6	12.9	13.7
Crime-persons	7.0	6.4	5.8	7.2	8.7	8.5
Crime-property	10.6	9.3	6.9	9.0	10.7	11.4
Disturbance	6.5	4.8	4.2	6.1	8.4	7.6
Juvenile	4.8	2.6	2.8	3.6	4.4	5.0
Miscellaneous	3.5	2.9	3.4	3.7	4.7	5.5
Prisoner-arrest	1.5	1.7	1.4	2.0	1.7	2.3
Prisoner-transport	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Suspicious person/vehicle	7.0	5.1	3.8	5.0	6.1	7.4
Traffic enforcement	21.5	23.3	21.3	19.8	29.1	22.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>86.0</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>70.9</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>98.3</b>	<b>95.3</b>


Methodology:

Calculations were limited to calls rather than events.

Observations:

- Traffic calls (accidents and enforcement) were the most common type of activities throughout the year.
- Traffic calls averaged between 24.8 and 34.2 calls per day throughout the year.
- The top three categories (traffic, crime, and investigations) averaged between 69 and 76 percent of total calls throughout the year.
- Investigations varied between 13.2 and 18.2 calls per day throughout the year.
- Crime calls varied between 12.6 and 19.9 calls per day throughout the year. This was between 18 and 21 percent of total calls.

**Figure 10. Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator**



**Note:** The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description on page 91.

**Table 7. Primary Unit's Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Police-initiated</b>		<b>Other-initiated</b>	
	<b>Total Calls</b>	<b>Minutes</b>	<b>Total Calls</b>	<b>Minutes</b>
Accidents	53	39.0	1,943	38.5
Alarm	10	12.7	1,436	15.3
Animal calls	21	9.2	69	26.2
Assist other agency	60	28.0	484	37.2
Check/investigation	298	41.1	3,915	36.3
Crime-persons	255	63.3	2,393	49.6
Crime-property	286	28.7	3,238	43.2
Disturbance	77	11.3	2,210	22.1
Juvenile	321	15.6	1,092	37.1
Miscellaneous	243	15.2	1,202	39.0
Prisoner-arrest	279	47.1	370	51.0
Prisoner-transport	6	156.2	11	90.3
Suspicious person/vehicle	637	10.2	1,456	20.5
Traffic enforcement	7,386	16.2	994	29.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,932</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>20,813</b>	<b>35.2</b>

Note: We removed seventeen calls with inaccurate busy times.

#### Methodology:

This information is limited to calls and excludes all events that show a zero time on scene. A unit's occupied time is measured as the time from when the call was received until it becomes available. The times shown are the average occupied times per call for the primary unit, rather than the total occupied time for all units assigned to a call.


#### Observations:

- A unit's average time spent on a call ranged from ten to fifty-two minutes overall.
- The longest average times (by graph category) were for other-initiated calls that were arrest related.

- Police-initiated traffic calls (accidents and enforcement) averaged sixteen minutes per call, whereas other-initiated traffic calls averaged thirty-five minutes per call.
- Average time spent on crime calls was forty-five minutes for police-initiated calls and forty-six minutes for other-initiated calls.



**Figure 11. Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category**




**Note:** The categories in this figure use weighted averages to combine those of the following table according to the description on page 91.

**Table 8. Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category**

Category	Police-initiated		Other-initiated	
	Average	Total Calls	Average	Total Calls
Accidents	1.5	53	1.4	1,943
Alarm	1.9	10	2.4	1,436
Animal calls	1.0	21	1.5	69
Assist other agency	1.3	60	1.7	484
Check/investigation	1.9	298	1.7	3,919
Crime-persons	1.8	255	2.0	2,400
Crime-property	1.3	286	1.4	3,241
Disturbance	1.7	77	2.1	2,210
Juvenile	1.2	321	1.5	1,094
Miscellaneous	1.3	243	1.4	1,202
Prisoner-arrest	2.0	279	2.1	370
Prisoner-transport	1.3	6	1.1	12
Suspicious person/vehicle	1.4	637	1.9	1,456
Traffic enforcement	1.3	7,386	1.4	994
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>9,932</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>20,830</b>

**Figure 12. Number of Responding Units, by Category**



**Note:** The categories in this figure use weighted averages to combine those of the following table according to the description on page 91.

**Table 9. Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-initiated Calls**

Category	Responding Units		
	One	Two	Three or More
Accidents	1,414	375	154
Alarm	79	861	496
Animal calls	40	23	6
Agency assist	262	146	76
Check/investigation	1,878	1,362	679
Crime-persons	972	787	641
Crime-property	2,412	543	286
Disturbance	691	879	640
Juvenile	679	299	116
Miscellaneous	831	268	103
Prisoner-arrest	105	165	100
Prisoner-transport	11	1	0
Suspicious person/vehicle	543	618	295
Traffic enforcement	688	224	82
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,605</b>	<b>6,551</b>	<b>3,674</b>


### Methodology:

The information in Table 8 and Figure 11 is limited to calls and excludes events with zero time on scene, as well as out-of-service records. The information in Table 9 and Figure 12 is further limited to other-initiated calls.

### Observations:

- The overall mean number of responding units was 1.3 for police-initiated calls and 1.7 for other-initiated calls.
- The mean numbers of responding units were as high as 2.1 for arrest calls that were other-initiated.
- Fifty-one percent of all other-initiated calls involved one responding unit.
- Thirty-one percent of all other-initiated calls involved two responding units.
- Eighteen percent of all other-initiated calls involved three or more units.
- The largest group of calls with three or more responding units involved investigations (alarm and checks) followed by suspicious incidents (suspicious person/vehicle and disturbance).


**Figure 13. Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Winter 2011**



**Table 10. Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Winter 2011**

Category	Per Day	
	Calls	Work Hours
Arrest	1.4	1.6
Assist other agency	1.4	1.2
Crime	12.3	16.0
General noncriminal	3.6	3.1
Investigations	13.8	13.7
Juvenile	3.7	2.9
Suspicious incident	9.3	5.1
Traffic	26.1	13.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>71.6</b>	<b>57.0</b>

**Figure 14. Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Summer 2011**



**Table 11. Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Summer 2011**

Category	Per Day	
	Calls	Work Hours
Arrest	2.3	2.7
Assist other agency	1.4	1.3
Crime	20.3	23.7
General noncriminal	5.9	4.8
Investigations	17.3	12.9
Juvenile	5.3	2.9
Suspicious incident	14.6	8.8
Traffic	27.1	13.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>94.2</b>	<b>70.2</b>

## Observations:

- In the summer, the total calls per day and workload were higher than in the winter.
- Total calls were ninety-four per day or 3.9 per hour.
- Total workload was seventy work hours per day, meaning that an average of 2.9 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Traffic constituted 29 percent of calls and 19 percent of workload.
- Crimes constituted 22 percent of calls but 34 percent of workload.
- Investigations constituted 18 percent of calls and 18 percent of workload.
- The top three categories constituted 69 percent of calls and 70 percent of workload.

## **B. Deployment**

The police department's main patrol force includes patrol officers and sergeants. In August 2011, between the 19th and 28th, additional officers were deployed as part of a traffic grant. We included these officers in the analysis. We only examined deployment information for four weeks in winter (January 31 to February 27, 2011) and four weeks in summer (August 1 to 28, 2011).

The police department's main patrol forces are scheduled on two twelve-hour shifts starting at 6:00 a.m. and at 6:00 p.m. There was one additional ten-hour shift scheduled from 3:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. on weekdays and from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. on weekends.


The police department deployed an average of 8.6 officers during the 24-hour day in winter (February) and 9.7 officers during the 24-hour day in summer (August). When the officers working on the traffic grant were included the average increased to 9.9 officers in August.

In this section, we describe the deployment and workload in distinct steps, distinguishing between summer and winter, and between weekdays and weekends:


- First, we focus on patrol deployment, with and without additional units.
- Next, we compare the deployment against workload based upon other-initiated calls for service.
- Finally, we draw a comparison based upon "all" workload, which includes police-initiated calls and out-of-service activities.

Comments follow each set of four figures, with separate discussions for summer and winter.

**Figure 15. Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2101**




**Figure 16. Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2011**






**Figure 17. Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2011**




**Figure 18. Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2011**




## Observations:

- For winter 2011:
  - The average total deployment was approximately 8.6 officers per hour during the week and 8.5 officers on weekends.
  - Total deployment varied between 6.2 and 12.6 officers per hour on weekdays, and between 6.4 and 11.3 officers per hour on weekends.
- For summer 2011:
  - The average patrol deployment was slightly higher in summer than in winter.
  - The average total deployment was about 9.7 officers per hour during the week and 9.6 officers on weekends.
  - Basic deployment varied between 7.5 and 12.5 officers per hour on weekdays, and between 6.9 and 12.5 officers per hour on weekends.
  - When the traffic officers were included, the average total deployment increased slightly to 9.8 on weekdays and 9.9 on weekends; the average number of officers deployed on the weekends reached a high of 13.5 officers between midnight and 1:30 a.m.


**Figure 19. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2011**




**Figure 20. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Winter 2011**



**Figure 21. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2011**




**Figure 22. Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Summer 2011**




## Observations:

- For winter 2011:
  - Average other-initiated workload was 1.8 officers per hour during the week and 2.2 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 21 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 25 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 43 percent of deployment between 3:30 p.m. and 3:45 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 45 percent of deployment between 9:45 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.
- For summer 2011:
  - Average other-initiated workload was 2.2 officers per hour during the week and 2.5 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 23 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 26 percent on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 36 percent of deployment between 4:15 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. and between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 53 percent of deployment between 3:30 a.m. and 3:45 a.m.


**Figure 23. Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2011**




**Figure 24. Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2011**



**Figure 25. Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2011**



**Figure 26. Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2011**



## Methodology:

These figures include deployment along with all workload from other-initiated, police-initiated, and out-of-service activities.

## Observations:

- For winter 2011:
  - Average workload was 3.5 officers per hour during the week and 3.7 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 41 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 44 percent on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 70 percent of deployment between 2:45 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 72 percent of deployment between 2:00 a.m. and 2:15 a.m.
- For summer 2011:
  - Average workload was 4.7 officers per hour during the week and 5.2 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 48 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 53 percent on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 71 percent of deployment between 2:45 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 77 percent of deployment between 3:15 a.m. and 3:30 a.m.



## **C. Response Times**

We analyzed the response times to various types of calls, separating the duration into dispatch and travel times. We begin the discussion with statistics that include all calls combined. We analyzed several types of calls to determine whether response times varied by call type.

Before presenting the specific figures and tables, we summarize all of the observations. We started with 4,560 events for summer 2011 and 3,318 events for winter 2011. We limited our analysis to other-initiated calls. We also encountered some calls without arrival times that we were forced to exclude from our analysis due to lack of information. This left 1,701 calls in summer and 1,343 calls in winter in our analysis.


Our initial analysis does not distinguish calls based on their priority. Instead, it examines the difference in response by time of day and compares summer and winter periods. After the overall statistics, we present a brief analysis of response time for high-priority calls.

Response time is measured as the difference between when a call is received and when the first unit arrives on scene.

## 1. All Calls

This section looks at all calls received; we examine the differences in response by both time of day and season (summer versus winter).


**Figure 27. Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, for Summer and Winter 2011**




## Observations:

- Average response times varied significantly by hour of day.
- The overall average response time was longer in winter than in summer.
- In summer, the longest response times were between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., with an average of about 17.4 minutes.
- In summer, the shortest response times were between midnight and 1:00 a.m., with an average of 7.9 minutes.
- In winter, the longest response times were between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., with an average of 15.7 minutes.
- In winter, the shortest response times were between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, with an average of 7.6 minutes.

**Figure 28. Average Response Time by Category, Summer 2011**



**Figure 29. Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2011**



**Table 12. Average Response Time by Category**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Summer 2011</b>	<b>Winter 2011</b>
Arrest	7.9	12.4
Assist other agency	10.5	9.9
Crime	12.1	14.0
General	12.6	13.1
Investigations	9.8	10.5
Juvenile	11.9	14.2
Suspicious	8.7	8.5
Traffic	10.1	10.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>11.4</b>

**Note:** The total average is weighted according to the number of calls per category.

Observations:

- In summer, average response times for most categories were between nine minutes and twelve minutes. The average response time was as short as eight minutes (for arrest calls) and as long as thirteen minutes (general noncriminal calls).
- In winter, the average response times for most categories were between ten minutes and thirteen minutes. The average response time was as short as nine minutes (for suspicious incidents) and as long as fourteen minutes (for juvenile calls).
- The average response time for crimes was twelve minutes in summer and fourteen minutes in winter.

**Table 13. 90th Percentiles for Response Time, by Category**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Summer 2011</b>	<b>Winter 2011</b>
Arrest	14.9	33.8
Assist other Agency	23.4	23.0
Crime	23.2	31.9
General	24.3	27.1
Investigations	16.9	21.1
Juvenile	21.8	29.2
Suspicious	14.9	15.1
Traffic	18.2	20.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>22.8</b>

**Note:** A 90th percentile value of twenty minutes means that 90 percent of all calls are responded to in fewer than twenty minutes.

Observations:

- In summer, 90th percentile values for response times were as short as fifteen minutes (for arrest and investigation calls) and as long as twenty-four minutes (for general noncriminal calls).
- In winter, 90th percentile values for response times were as short as fifteen minutes (for suspicious incidents) and as long as thirty-four minutes (for arrest calls).

## *2. High-Priority Calls – Motor Vehicle Accidents with Injury*

There was no reliable field in the data to distinguish between high-priority and low-priority calls. Instead, we examined motor vehicle injury accidents, under the assumption that these required an emergency response. Records show there are valid response times for 144 accidents of this type from September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2011.

The average total response time for calls that involved accidents with injury was 8.0 minutes, which was 2.8 minutes shorter than the overall yearly average of 10.8 minutes. Ninety percent of motor vehicle accidents with injury had a response time of less than 13.8 minutes.

## Appendix A. Crime Statistics and Rates

### Crimes Committed and Police Officer Count, 2009

Agency	Pop.	Police Officers	Non-sworn	Violent Crimes	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Property Crimes	Burglary	Larceny	MV Theft
U.S.	308.7 m	705,009	308,599	1.246 m	14,748	84,767	367,832	778,901	9.1 m	2.2 m	6.2 m	.74 m
Nebraska	1.83 m.	3,527	1,278	5,104	54	672	1,025	3,353	48,821	8,326	36,881	3,614
Bellevue City	52,330	101	18	69	1	19	16	33	1,345	169	1,054	122
Fremont	25,262	49	39	49	0	13	5	31	801	113	662	26
Grand Island	47,736	72	10	168	2	31	22	113	2,297	373	1,829	95
Hastings	25,705	36	12	33	0	15	2	16	746	84	631	31
Kearney	31,436	52	14	62	0	10	3	49	872	112	734	26
Lincoln	259,672	325	85	1,258	2	143	182	931	10,218	1,464	8,406	348
Norfolk City	23,523	39	15	44	2	23	10	9	706	74	601	31
North Platte	24,429	41	25	55	0	20	3	32	1,131	162	918	51
Omaha	464,628	789	129	2,263	34	194	723	1,312	17,334	3,046	12,091	2,197
Papillion	25,213	39	4	27	0	8	3	16	322	23	283	16



## UCR Crime Rates and Rank, 2009

Agency	Pop.	Police Officers	Police Officers per 1000	PO Rank	Violent Crimes, Total	VC Rate	VC Rank	Property Crimes, Total	PC Rate	PC Rank	UCR Crime Rate	Total Rank
U.S.	308.7 m	705,009	2.28	-	1.25 m	404	-	9.08 m	2,942	-	3,346	-
Nebraska	1.83 m	3,527	1.93	-	5,104	279	-	48,821	2,673	-	2,953	-
Omaha	464,628	789	1.70	2	2,263	487	1	17,334	3,728	4	4,214	4
Lincoln	259,672	325	1.25	10	1,258	484	2	10,218	3,930	3	4,414	3
Bellevue City	52,330	101	1.93	1	69	133	8	1,345	2,587	9	2,719	9
Grand Island	47,738	72	1.51	8	168	350	3	2,297	4,785	1	5,135	1
Kearney	31,436	52	1.65	5	62	200	5	872	2,813	8	3,013	7
Hastings	25,705	36	1.40	9	33	127	9	746	2,869	7	2,996	8
Fremont	25,262	39	1.54	7	49	196	6	801	3,204	5	3,400	5
Papillion	25,213	39	1.55	6	27	108	10	322	1,288	10	1,396	10
North Platte	24,429	41	1.68	3	55	229	4	1,131	4,713	2	4,942	2
Norfolk	23,523	39	1.66	4	44	183	7	706	2,942	6	3,125	6

### UCR Individual Crimes, Rate, and Rank, 2009

Agency	Murder	Murder Rate	Murder Rank	Rape	Rape Rate	Rape Rank	Robbery	Robbery Rate	Robbery Rank	Assault	Assault Rate	Assault Rank
U.S.	14,748	4.8	-	84,767	27	-	367,832	119	-	778,901	252	-
Nebraska	54	3.0	-	672	34	-	1,025	67	-	3,353	182	-
Omaha	34	7.3	2	194	42	7	723	156	1	1,312	283	2
Lincoln	2	0.8	5	143	55	5	182	70	2	931	358	1
Bellevue City	1	1.9	4	19	37	8	16	31	5	33	63	8
Grand Island	2	4.2	3	31	65	3	22	46	3	113	235	3
Kearney	0	0.0	6	10	32	10	3	10	9	49	158	4
Hastings	0	0.0	6	15	58	4	2	8	10	16	62	9
Fremont	0	0.0	6	20	80	2	3	12	8	32	128	5
Papillion	0	0.0	6	13	52	6	5	20	6	31	124	6
North Platte	0	0.0	6	8	33	9	3	13	7	16	67	7
Norfolk	2	8.3	1	23	96	1	10	42	4	9	38	10

### UCR Individual Crimes, Rate, and Rank, 2009 Continued

Agency	Burglary	Burglary Rate	Burglary Rank	Larceny	Larceny Rate	Larceny Rank	MV Theft	MV Theft Rate	MV Theft Rank
U.S.	2,159,878	700	-	6,185,867	2,004	-	737,142	239	-
Nebraska	8,326	456	-	36,881	2,020	-	3,614	198	-
Omaha	3,228	696	2	12,091	2,606	5	2,197	473	1
Lincoln	1,618	622	3	8,406	3,233	3	348	134	5
Bellevue City	203	390	8	1,054	2,027	9	122	235	2
Grand Island	373	777	1	1,829	3,810	2	95	198	4
Kearney	151	487	5	734	2,368	8	26	84	9
Hastings	114	438	7	631	2,427	7	31	119	7
Fremont	117	468	6	662	2,648	4	26	104	8
Papillion	34	136	10	283	1,132	10	16	64	10
North Platte	137	571	4	918	3,825	1	51	213	3
Norfolk	70	292	9	601	2,504	6	31	129	6